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Preface 
In the last couple of months, I did several interviews with German adult edu-
cation students who are currently studying abroad in Europe and the United 
States.  Asked about their experiences in their  host countries,  many  of them 
told me they were having a hard time explaining what adult education is al 
about, frequently encountering questions such as, ‘Why should adults be learn-
ing?  Adults  have finished their schooling and  vocational training  – aren’t 
they done with learning?’ Some even told me they actualy met people who 
saw no need whatsoever for ofering adult education programmes. 
Now this sounds very strange to the ears of German adult education stu-
dents. Germany, after al, has had publicly funded adult education courses for 
about  90  years; for  more than  40  years, there have  been academic  pro-
grammes designed to train adult education professionals. Adults do learn on a 
daily  basis.  But adult  ways of learning are mostly  discussed in other terms. 
Informal learning, for example, is caled ‘gaining experience’, ‘observing’, 
‘reading’, ‘discussing’, ‘researching’, or ‘going by trial and error’. Organised 
learning arangements are caled ‘human resource  development’, ‘(profes-
sionnal) training’, ‘coaching’, ‘mentoring’, or ‘atending conferences’. 
To support these adult learning activities – which we cal adult education – 
research shows that we need to adopt diferent approaches from those we em-
ploy to support the learning of children. Adults’ conscious or unconscious deci-
sion for or against learning is crucialy important here. Adults, after al, are not 
blank slates to simply be writen on. They have developed structures and inter-
pretation  paterns  with  which they see the  world.  Relevance and  personal 
meaning are more important. Adult educators, therefore, have to address the in-
ternal structures and interpretation paterns of their target group. They have to 
identify the aspects and topics that adult learners care about. They need to cre-
ate connections between the learning subject and the knowledge, skils, and at-
titudes of the adult target group. In the context of adult education, these aspects 
are caled ‘target group orientation’ and ‘connectivity’. 
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In this study guide, Henning Pätzold provides an overview of key learn-
ing theories and  what they  mean in terms  of teaching. In  Part  One,  he  pre-
sents a selection of learning theories drawn from the broad academic field of 
education, introducing readers to a variety of approaches for designing theo-
ries of adult learning: learning triangles, relational perspectives, logical mod-
els and stages, as  wel as comprehensive approaches.  The  presentation in-
cludes learning theories developed by scholars from several countries, there-
by providing an insight into diferent international learning theories. Henning 
Pätzold takes these theories to serve as basis for Part Two of his book, which 
is focused on didactics, or adult teaching methods. Here, he ilustrates some 
of the  practical implications  of the learning theories  presented in  Part  One. 
According to the author, the folowing aspects are central for adult learning 
arrangements: reflection, time, person, and lifeworld. 
Henning  Pätzold  has  been studying international learning theories for 
several years and has taught the subject multiple times as an online module 
within the  European  Master in  Adult  Education  programme in  Duisburg-
Essen.  As a result, some aspects  presented in this study  guide  have already 
been tried out in practice. In the overal context of the Study Guides in Adult 
Education series, this  guide  has  been  designed to supplement and expand 
upon the ideas presented in the preceding volume by Paul Bélanger. My sin-
cere thanks go to Henning Pätzold for his contribution to this series. 
 
Regina Egetenmeyer 
1.  Introduction 
‘Nothing is as practical as a good theory.’ The great theorist of psychology, 
Kurt  Lewin, is said to have coined this statement, although it  was probably 
made earlier. A sweeping proposition like this one certainly eases the work of 
the scholarly writer tremendously, since no justification or excuse has to be 
provided for filing shelf after shelf  with sophisticated theoretical treatises, 
which al have to be regarded as ‘practical’ by their mere existence. There is 
more to  Lewin’s  proposition,  however, than  merely rubber-stamping any 
theoretical efort  whatsoever.  Theory necessarily comes into  play  whenever 
routines and simple recipes turn out to be insuficient. Unfortunately, this situa-
tion is the rule rather than the exception in the field of adult education. After 
al, each teaching and learning situation is, first and foremost, an encounter 
with diversity. Participants meet each other, get to know the course contents, 
and meet the adult educator, who in turn encounters the participants and wil 
probably also gain new perspectives on what he or she is teaching. These in-
gredients  make  up a complex social field  which  positively cannot  be ad-
dressed by applying simple recipes. 
In fact, such complexity lies at the core of the social sciences, which are 
sometimes rather derogatorily referred to as ‘soft sciences’. However, as the 
wel-known representative  of constructivist thinking,  Heinz  von  Foerster, 
who earned  his first  merits in the ‘hard science’ field  of computer science, 
once put it, ‘the hard sciences .. deal with the soft problems, the soft sciences 
..  deal  with the  hard  problems’ (von  Foerster,  1972,  p.  1).  From a cyber-
neticist’s point of view, a problem is hard if there are multiple solutions that 
cannot be precisely determined based on the given circumstances. Multiply-
ing 100-digit numbers, for example, is a soft problem because there is only 
one solution; moreover, from a logical point of view, the coresponding equa-
tion is tautological. Developing a strategy to ease language learning for im-
migrants, in contrast, is a hard problem because (a) there are infinite numbers 
of  possible solutions, and (b)  we cannot  determine  which  of them  would 
work best based on the problem alone, not to mention the secondary effects 
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each of them might have on other areas of social life. Science deals with such 
complexity through theory. And theory is designed to reduce complexity to a 
degree that, on the one hand, covers the important aspects  of an area of re-
search, and,  on the  other  hand, renders it  manageable for further investiga-
tion, experiment and, eventualy, application. This leads to an important qua-
lifier in Lewin’s statement: good theory is what is required. 
 
Keyword: Learning theory 
 
A theory (Greek: θεωρία) can be understood as a particular mode of 
looking at and describing a phenomenon. A scientific theory should 
consist of statements that are intersubjectively comprehensible and 
unambiguous. A learning theory thus should provide statements on 
learning which contribute to a comprehensive picture of learning, 
helping us to observe and describe the phenomenon of learning. By 
providing particular ‘interpretations and understanding of educational 
practice’ (Biesta, 2009, p. 2), such a theory may very wel support such 
practice; however, it cannot serve as ful legitimisation for any particu-
lar action. 
  
A  good theory  of learning for adult education should reduce the complex 
phenomenon  of (human) learning in a  way that alows an adult educator to 
think about concrete ways to facilitate learning in classroom situations. There 
are numerous theories of learning, some of which are wel known (e.g. beha-
viourism  or cognitivism);  however, as  psychological theories, they serve a 
different  purpose. Important as they are as theoretical  points  of reference, 
their usefulness is quite limited for planning or conducting courses, which is 
why this text touches on them only briefly (in Chapter 6) and does not try to 
present them from an adult education perspective. Readers interested in gen-
eral learning theories are encouraged to consult other resources for more de-
tailed explanations (e.g. Bélanger, 2011; LeFrançois, 2005). Instead, the first 
part of this book provides an insight into some of the major contributions to 
learning theory with respect to pedagogy. These contributions represent a va-
riety of approaches which have been selected to not only cover the main cur-
rents of recent pedagogical learning theory, but also to be instructive with re-
spect to managing learning from an adult educator’s point of view. As a con-
sequence, they address the phenomenon of learning from quite different an-
gles, ranging from the emotional  perspective and formal logic to compre-
hensive approaches. Al in al, this part is intended to give an insight into how 
human learning is  understood and  discussed  within adult education.  How-
ever, any selection  of  major theoretical contributions  may always  be criti-
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cised for overlooking this or that approach or even a whole school of think-
ing. In this respect, the present study guide is no exception. Without a doubt, 
one may claim that certain positions not included here also deserve mention-
ing. Space, however, is limited. As a result, the selection presented here does 
not claim to be complete. Instead it has been designed to provide a coherent 
picture. There are other legitimate and important concepts that have not been 
included because they were not considered to contribute significantly to this 
particular picture – which is not at al to say their general quality is caled in-
to question. 
Due to the  nature  of this study  guide, the theories  presented in  Part  One 
have been simplified to a considerable degree. While the more recent of them 
sometimes are merely based on a few articles or a single book, others have long 
since initiated a broad debate that has resulted in a wide range of projects, ar-
ticles, and books. As far as possible, the folowing sections seek to capture the 
core ideas of each theory by refering to the basic texts and by providing some 
of the  wel-known figures for ilustration.  As a result, the theories  become 
available for immediate pedagogical reflection. Furthermore, as in the other vol-
umes  of the study  guide series, readers are supported in their reflections  by a 
number of tasks and exercises at the end of each chapter. 
Applying theoretical considerations is also the  main focus  of  Part  Two, 
which begins with an introduction to the usage of a somewhat dificult term: 
didactic. Although the term represents a rich and fruitful discussion through-
out centuries of European thinking about education, didactics also has a nega-
tive connotation.  Chapter  7 clarifies the term  with respect to the context  of 
this study guide. Furthermore, it provides an overview of some of the major 
didactic approaches,  which  may claim to represent  diferent ‘models’  of 
teaching.  The text  wil  not  give a comprehensive  presentation  of the  main 
curents in didactic thinking with respect to such models, however. There are 
just too many of them – and, what is more important, even though they make 
constructive contributions to the  discussion, these  models and approaches 
usualy cannot be regarded as theories. Therefore, they rather serve as further 
background for interpretation. The folowing chapter then goes on to discuss 
didactic implications from three perspectives, namely time, person, and life-
world as the crucial characteristic conditions of human learning. Embracing 
these perspectives is intended to encourage and support didactic thinking that 
is related to practice and wel grounded in theory. Therefore, instead of pro-
viding schemata or ‘rules’ for teaching, we shal look at time, person, and life-
world to arive at  more  general  didactic conclusions,  which I  hope are stil 
concrete enough to  be  useful for teaching.  Moreover, they are intended to 
foster the mutual consideration of theory and practice. 
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Ralph St. Clair once reflected on this relationship, stating that theory and 
practice are  prepared to  maintain ‘a  beautiful friendship’ (St.  Clair,  2004). 
Folowing this metaphor, we might say that theory, on the one hand, shal not 
impose regulations on practice (and vice versa), but, as a good friend, insist 
on  problematic issues even if this should initialy iritate and complicate 
practice. Practical experience, on the other hand, shal always be prepared to 
chalenge theory in case the later just  does  not seem to  pay atention any-
more. St. Clair’s study has not only provided us with a nice metaphor, it has 
also revealed an unexpected and encouraging fact: not only do practitioners 
use scientific contributions to their field, their usage even increases through-
out the time they are working in the field – as long as they are equipped to 
fulfil the general preconditions: knowledge about ongoing research and profi-
ciency in the coresponding  professional terminology.  This study  guide, as 
the other volumes in this series, is designed to support readers in further de-
veloping both. 
 
 
Part One: 
Theories of Learning: 
A Field of Approaches towards 
the Learning of Adults 
2.  Of Learning Triangles and Beyond 
2.1  Introducing systematic approaches 
Triangles are  often  used to represent relationships in a  plain and easy  way, 
and education is  no exception in this respect. In fact, one  of the  most com-
mon figures in education is the so-caled didactic triangle (see Figure 1). It 
represents a  quite  general relationship  between the learner, the teacher, and 
the issue.  The  model,  of course,  has  undergone several alterations; recent 
concepts in particular emphasise the fact that the various relationships within 
the model are not of the same type. For example, according to a more andra-
gogical concept, the teacher is a mere moderator of the relationship between 
the other two instances. We wil refer to that later when discussing relational 
didactics (see Chapter 3). 
 
Figure 1: Didactic triangle 
 
Source: Arnold & Pätzold, 2007, p. 95 
Although the didactic triangle focuses on the three main structural entities in 
the learning-teaching-process, the learning triangle we wil discuss in the fol-
lowing section is related to the learner (see Figure 2). Conceptualised by the 
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Danish educational scientist Knud Ileris, the learning triangle, too, has under-
gone several changes, but the core concept has remained the same. Basicaly, 
Ileris (2003, 2004, 2006) addresses three issues related to the learning of an 
individual: 
•  Learning takes place in a socio-cultural context. 
•  Learning has a cognitive dimension. 
•  Learning has an emotional (or psychodynamic) dimension. 
 
Keyword: Socio-cultural context 
 
Any learning activity is influenced by the fact that the learner is situa-
ted in some kind of context. This context consists of other persons as 
wel as of a variety of cultural influences such as convictions, habits, 
rules, and so forth. In brief, the socio-cultural context can be defined as 
the various social and cultural factors that influence a particular learn-
ing process. (Obviously, it is not an easy task to identify those influ-
ences. It is al the more important, therefore, not to abstract from the 
socio-cultural context when discussing learning.) 
 
Although the first issue is frequently considered in theories of social learning, 
it tends to be underestimated in more psychologicaly oriented contributions 
to learning theory (see Schäfter, 2010, p. 297). The second and third issues 
resemble the concept  of cognitive and afective learning  goals,  which  were 
first addressed in the second half of the twentieth century. What is important 
to point out here is that Ileris rejects the idea of separating cognitive learning 
processes  on the  one  hand from affective  or emotional  ones  on the  other. 
When it comes to learning, emotions and cognition rather are two sides of the 
same coin.  They are always afected simultaneously, regardless  of  whether 
the subject  mater is intended to afect  one side  more than the  other.  How-
ever, they serve  diferent functions:  Whereas the cognitive side leads to 
knowledge and skils, enabling the individual to ‘function’ (Ileris,  2004,  p. 
94), the emotional or psychodynamic side (Ileris uses both terms) serves to 
maintain a balance between inner and outer world and therefore to establish 
sensitivity (ibid.) – that is, the ability to react to external stimuli in nuanced 
and adequate ways with regard to emotions. 
 
  
17 
Figure 2: Ileris’s learning triangle 
 
Source: Ileris, 2004, p. 95 
 
The social dimension is characterised by our aim to integrate ourselves into 
certain social contexts. Although learning may be seen as an individual pro-
cess of balancing emotional and cognitive aspects, it is always in some way 
related to the environment. Therefore, the process of learning consists of two 
simultaneous processes: a process of interaction, in which learning mediates 
between the individual and his or her social environment (cf. Geulen & Hur-
relmann, 1980, p. 51), and a process of acquiring knowledge and skils as an 
evolution of cognitive and emotional perspectives towards the subject mater. 
From the perspective of systems theory, we may now ask about the pre-
cise nature of the individual that Ileris places in opposition to its social envi-
ronment. Niklas Luhmann describes this interaction as a process that can be 
observed in the social world, yet the relationship between interaction and in-
dividual is a  mater  of  different  kinds  of  observation and atribution (cf. 
Luhmann,  1995,  p.  256).  Moreover, the rather  psychological terms  of emo-
tion and cognition raise the  question  of  whether the  body  of the individual 
may already  be regarded as some type  of environmental condition (ibid,  p. 
262). Generaly, this question draws our atention to the fact that the body is 
not a main focus in Ileris’s concept. But we may, for the moment, translate 
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individual freely with person and come back to that point later, especialy as 
Ileris claims to cover the concept of personal development (Ileris, 2006, p. 
30) within his approach. With that in mind, his theory already prepares us for 
dealing with the conceptual framework designed by Jarvis (see Chapter 5.1), 
who emphasises that it is ‘the person who learns’ (Jarvis, 2006, p. 32). The 
person learns within a social world, however, and Ileris introduces the notion 
of sociality to point out that this social world shal offer desirable prospects. 
The process of acquisition is an interplay between the poles of cognition 
and emotion. Ileris uses these terms in a rather metaphorical way. The cog-
nitive  dimension  means that the individual  develops the ability to construct 
meaning (of things, facts, or situations) and therefore to function as a person. 
Note that ‘functioning’ in this context does not mean subordinating oneself to 
foreign  purposes,  but  being able to think and act according to  one’s  own 
goals. The emotional dimension relates to an individual’s feelings, which ac-
company any learning  process.  Again, Ileris refers to the  whole psycho-
dynamic  dimension (Ileris,  2006,  p.  31)  – that is, ‘mental energy, feelings, 
and motivations’ (ibid.). 
From an analytical point of view, it may seem useful to separate the in-
ternal  process  of acquisition from the social  process  of interaction  between 
individual and environment.  Yet, for a comprehensive  picture  of learning, 
both of them have to be considered simultaneously. They serve as a kind of 
scaffolding for  describing a learning  process  or a learning episode.  For ex-
ample, if  we explore the role  of  motivation (which is  part  of the emotional 
pole in Ileris’s model) within the theory of self-determination (Ryan & Deci, 
2000), it seems that motivation depends considerably on the extent to which a 
particular environment ofers opportunities to experience autonomy. 
2.2  Levels of energy 
Against this background, Ileris focuses on the process of acquisition and de-
scribes four distinct types or levels of learning with respect to the amount of 
change and  psychic efort they require.  His typology closely resembles the 
thinking of Gregory Bateson, who explored a similar general idea (see Chap-
ter 4). Yet it also introduces the additional thought of relating diferent levels 
of learning to diferent biographical phases. Moreover, by explicitly refering 
to Mezirow’s concept of transformative learning and Piaget’s developmental 
approach, it is linked to two other important taxonomic approaches of learn-
ing. 
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Figure 3: Levels of learning 
 
Source: cf. Ileris, 2006 
The most simple type, ‘cumulation or mechanical learning’ (Ileris, 2004, p. 
96)  denotes the isolated acquisition  of  bits  of information. Ileris states that 
although this type is dominant among children, it is less important for adults 
(except when memorising a phone number and the like). Yet research shows 
that cumulative learning is of high systematic importance even among adults: 
memorising  plays a crucial role in learning foreign languages, for example. 
The next two types are denoted in terms borrowed from Jean Piaget: assimi-
lative learning and accommodative learning.  The former is  described as the 
most common type of learning; it is also the usual way of learning at school. 
On this level,  new information is integrated into existing concepts  without 
chalenging their core structure. Compared to cumulative learning, it can be 
imagined as not only piling up information, but also as sorting it according to 
a pre-existing system. Learning to use a new technical device, for example, 
often fals into this category. Although the specific procedures to operate the 
device may difer in detail, they are usualy stil similar to those used to oper-
ate previous versions of the device. The third type, accommodation, in con-
trast, requires more efort as it afects the system of knowledge itself. As de-
scribed  by  Piaget, accommodation  means  not  only to acquire  new informa-
tion, but also to reshape the existing system of concepts in a certain domain, 
as the new information wil not comply with the old structure and, even when 
it  does, cannot  be  neglected.  Learning  new theories, for example,  often re-
quires us to temporarily ‘forget’ what other theories say about the same issue, 
and to start rethinking the mater ‘from scratch’ instead. Ileris’s fourth type 
of learning goes beyond Piaget’s model and is linked to Mezirow’s concept 
of transformative learning (ibid,  p.  97).  Mezirow  himself  distinguishes  be-
tween two types of transformative learning: the ‘transformation of paterns of 
meaning’ (Mezirow,  1997,  p.  78)  questions the interpretational  background 
against which new experiences or insights are processed. It therefore resemb-
les Piaget’s concept of accommodation. But to the extent to which transfor-
mation also afects the very person of the learner, it may go beyond accom-
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modation. In this case,  Mezirow speaks  of ‘perspective transformation’ 
(ibid.),  which is the  deepest change an individual  may  undergo  within the 
process of learning. Here, one’s own ‘perspectives of meaning’ (ibid., p. 38) 
are fundamentaly transformed: basic convictions and beliefs are profoundly 
changed against the  background  of  new experiences.  Therefore this type  of 
learning is often associated with life crises. 
Different taxonomies  of learning, such as those  of  Mezirow and Ileris, 
are not identical, but they share a number of core ideas: 
•  Learning experiences can vary in depth. 
•  These  variations are related to the extent to  which the learning expe-
rience afects the whole person (identity, values, etc.). 
•  The depth of the learning process, therefore, is also related to its sustain-
ability. 
Accordingly, transformative learning requires more mental energy and deeply 
afects a learner’s cognitive and emotional processes at the same time.  Evi-
dently, this often leads to changes in the learner’s social environment as wel. 
What we can learn from Ileris’s approach in terms of arriving at a com-
prehensive  understanding of adult learning is that any type  of learning may 
turn out to be relevant for the development of competence. The different lev-
els build upon each other, even though they are not meant to form a particular 
hierarchy in which on type of learning is more valuable than another. Moreo-
ver, there is a considerable degree of overlap: transformative learning, for ex-
ample,  may contain aspects  of al  of the  other levels  of learning  described 
above. We wil return to this concept in Chapter 4.2. 
Exercises and tasks 
Exercise 1 
In this chapter, the expression ‘levels of energy’ is used in a somewhat meta-
phorical  way.  What types  of (physical  or  mental) energy  might  play a role 
with respect to the diferent levels of learning? 
Exercise 2 
What  may provide the energy to sustain  dificult learning  processes?  Think 
of personal examples. 
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Exercise 3 
At the beginning of this chapter, it was said that memorising phone numbers 
could be regarded as cumulative learning. However, can you imagine condi-
tions and situations in which it may be more than just that? 
Task 1 
Have a look at the self-determination theory of motivation by Ryan and Deci 
(see source below). How may the influences on motivation mentioned there 
have an impact on each of the four levels of learning depicted in Figure 3? 
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation 
of intrinsic motivation, social development, and wel-being. American Psycho-
logist, 55(1), 68–78. 
 

3.  Relational Perspectives on Learning 
When comparing Ileris’s approach to the didactic triangle,  we find that  his 
emphasis is  on the learner.  Furthermore,  by  paying special atention to the 
general relationship  between the learner and  others,  he  mainly looks at the 
social aspects of learning. A diferent aproach wil investigate the relation-
ship between the learner and the issue. From the variety of approaches to cap-
ture this relationship,  we  wil  now take a closer look at  phenomenography 
(cf. Marton, 1992) and the concept of relational didactics (cf. Gieseke, 2007). 
3.1  Phenomenography 
The  phenomenographic approach  originated from experiments in learning re-
search: Ference Marton and his coleagues at Gothenburg University (Sweden) 
started  out  with the assumption that ‘the  most important form  of learning in-
volves changing the way a person experiences, conceptualizes, or understands a 
phenomenon’ (Marton, 1992, p. 253). The core terms of this assumption – ex-
perience, concept, and understanding  – should therefore be the  main focus 
when conducting learning research. However, Marton and his coleagues were 
wel aware that ‘observing students engaged in studying is realy not a very re-
warding research  method.  There is simply  not  much to  observe’ (Marton  & 
Säljö,  2005,  p.  40).  Therefore they applied a  qualitative research  design in 
which students were asked to gain information out of text material presented to 
them. Afterwards, the results of this process were analysed with regard to learn-
ing outcomes and metacognitive dimensions (ibid., p. 41). This approach may 
seem rather conventional, but it marks an important shift away from other types 
of learning research. Instead of describing behaviour – by looking at individu-
als  or into individuals, as it  were,  by analysing their  mental  or  neuronal 
processes  –  Marton and  his coleagues ‘aim at an experiential  description [.. 
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and therefore] are trying to look with them and see the  world as they see it’ 
(Marton, 1992, p. 257). Furthermore, instead of looking at the eficacy of learn-
ing in terms of how much is learned (within a given time or efort), phenome-
nography ‘seeks to investigate “what is learned” ’ (Dahlgren,  2005,  p.  27) in 
terms of a qualitative change in the person-world relationship. 
Originaly, the term phenomenography was used only to refer to the re-
search method; later, it was also applied to the concept of learning implicit to 
this  methodological  design.  As the concept  places a strong focus  on the 
change of concepts on the learner’s side, the term variation theory is some-
times used as wel. 
The main results of their research led Marton and his coleagues to for-
mulate a specific conception of learning that emphasises the three core terms 
mentioned above. Learning, in this perspective, consists of a change in 
• the concepts learners have regarding a particular subject mater 
• the understanding learners have of that mater 
• the experiences learners have or may have with this mater. 
 
Keywords: Concept, understanding, and experience in phenomenography 
 
Concept in this context refers to an individual’s idea of what belongs 
to an entity and what kind of relationship exists between its parts. 
Understood as a kind of inner representation of an external phenome-
non, the term is used very much the way we use it in everyday speech. 
The term understanding, in contrast, has a more specific meaning with-
in phenomenography or variation theory: it addresses the possible ex-
periential relations between a person and a phenomenon. Understand-
ing, in other words, shapes the ways in which we can relate ourselves 
to the outer world of experience (Marton, 1992). Consequently, expe-
rience means the factual realisation of the person’s encounter of the 
phenomenon against the background of his or her concept and under-
standing. 
 
An important idea in phenomenography is that understanding is a process be-
tween the individual and the decontextualised phenomenon; once understand-
ing is gained, it refers only to the phenomenon and is not bound to a particu-
lar context or situation: 
What we end up with is the conclusion that diferent understandings of phenomena are not 
specific to particular contexts, although they cannot occur other than in some context, and 
they are not specific to particular psychological acts, although they cannot occur other than 
in some psychological act. On the other hand, they are specific to the particular phenome-
non of which they are understandings. (Marton, 1992, p. 261) 
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Hence, in this particular meaning, understanding is regarded as a ‘nonpsycho-
logical category’ (ibid, p. 262). 
The third crucial term is experience. Here, the focus is on the actual en-
counter of the phenomenon and the learner. As stated above, this encounter is 
predetermined  by  understanding.  Again,  we refer to  one  of the  original as-
sumptions. Marton and Säljö argued that ‘if the outcome  of learning difers 
between individuals, then the very process of learning which leads to difer-
ent outcomes must also have differed’ (2005, p. 40). In other words, the stu-
dents  must  have  had  diferent experiences.  But although there is a  virtualy 
infinite  number  of  possible experiences  one can  have  with a  phenomenon, 
Marton and  Pang (1999) argue that this  diversity  of experiences can  be re-
duced to clusters: 
Every phenomenon can be experienced in a finite number of qualitatively diferent ways. In 
order to characterize the variation in ways people experience various phenomena, it is impor-
tant to understand what it means to experience a phenomenon in a particular way. (p. 4) 
Combining al  of these considerations, the  phenomenographic approach 
comes up with a specific idea of learning: learning is the change that occurs 
in a person’s concepts, understandings, and experience with respect to a parti-
cular phenomenon. This change may be observed by distinguishing between 
a limited  number  of  diferent  understandings. (The  number is limited  when 
we only distinguish between qualitative diferences.) 
The phenomenographic theory of learning may be applied to a physical 
object, let’s say a thermostat, for example.  Although there is a  variety  of 
possible understandings of a thermostat as a valve, the basic idea is the same: 
a thermostat would be regarded as some passage of variable size alowing a 
certain amount  of  hot  water to  pass.  A qualitatively  different  understanding 
of a thermostat would be that of a control circuit: based on a certain seting, a 
mechanism inside the thermostat automaticaly regulates the amount of water 
passing into the  heating system  by  measuring the surounding temperature. 
Again, there would be diferent ways of imagining this particular mechanism, 
but they al share the same basic idea. 
The idea of a limited variety of qualitatively distinguishable understand-
ings  of a  phenomenon also  holds  with respect to social  or cultural  pheno-
mena. As another example, we might look at our understanding of morality. 
Since  Piaget’s and  Kohlberg’s efforts, empirical research  has shown that 
people tend to argue about moral decisions against the background of a par-
ticular concept  of  morality,  which  usualy changes over the course of one’s 
personal development. From the early stages, in which morality is merely re-
garded as abiding by rules that were set by others, it evolves into concepts of 
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a  moraly adjusted social community and, finaly, into an individual set  of 
wel-founded values and norms. 
The example regarding the evolution of moral judgement not only shows 
how the idea of qualitatively distinguishable concepts has proven fruitful in 
other branches of the social sciences, it also provides another example of how 
a learning process can be framed as a series of sequential steps along the lines 
of Ileris’s four levels of learning. In this context, the phenomenographic ap-
proach can be applied to itself, resulting in a sequence of distinct concepts of 
learning,  which  may  be compared to  other  hierarchies (see  Chapter  4).  The 
original results produced five such concepts of learning, but eventualy Mar-
ton et al. added a sixth one (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Levels of learning in the phenomenographic approach 
 
Source: cf. Marton, Dal’Alba, & Beaty, 1993, pp. 283ff. 
Figure  4 shows that there is a  kind  of sequence from  one level to another. 
Nevertheless, the  model should  not  be confused  with fixed sets of develop-
mental stages (as in the example of developing moral judgement), because al 
levels may occur simultaneously or in a diferent sequence in certain learning 
processes, depending on which aspect of dealing with content is actualy ob-
served.  There is a ‘watershed’ (Marton et al.,  1993,  p.  288),  however,  be-
tween the first three levels and the second three.  Whereas the former three 
deal with the mere acquisition of content (including its more or less uncritical 
application), the later three always relate to meaning. 
The first level, increasing  one’s knowledge, simply  means  gathering 
new information that  does  not in any  way interfere  with  one’s existing 
knowledge.  This  may  happen, for example,  when  we incidentaly learn 
about the specific location of a room inside a building. Memorising and re-
producing, in our example, would mean trying to memorise the position of 
certain rooms in a  building,  maybe  by  using a floor  plan.  The  next level, 
applying,  differs from the  previous  one in that  knowledge is applied. (In 
27 
our example, we might try to create our own floor plan based on our know-
ledge of the building.) 
As stated above,  meaning  only  plays a  minor role in those  processes. 
This changes as soon as  we  get to understanding,  or, as  Marton and  Säljö 
have caled it elsewhere, ‘the abstraction of meaning’ (2005, p. 55). As poin-
ted  out above,  understanding is a core term in the theory  of  phenomeno-
graphy, and  once  more the focus is  on this  particular type  of learning, in 
which knowledge is processed in ways that are not completely foreseeable (as 
is more or less the case with the first three levels). Consequently, the remain-
ing two levels go further into that direction: seeing something in a diferent 
way already affects the core  of the  person-phenomenon relationship, and 
changing as a person eventualy expands the possible impact of learning to 
include any relevant process of human change. 
Phenomenography, or variation theory, links some more or less analyti-
caly  oriented approaches of learning theory and research (e.g. a system  of 
levels of learning) with the philosophical tradition of phenomenology. At the 
same time, it tries to establish an alternative to  psychological concepts  of 
learning and is  quite suitable for  drawing  didactic conclusions (see  Part 
Two).  This  puts  phenomenography in line  with an arguably  underestimated 
theoretical framework that aims to capture the human phenomenon of learn-
ing from a  qualitative  perspective  without abandoning the  methodological 
and analytical standards of contemporary social science (see also Göhlich & 
Zirfas, 2008; Jarvis, 2006, 2009; Meyer-Drawe, 2008; Roth 2004). 
3.2 Relational didactics 
Our starting point, the didactic triangle, suggested that pedagogical situations 
can always  be seen from a relational  perspective.  As  with  other theories  of 
networks, systems, and so forth, this is basicaly done by puting the focus on 
the edges of the model instead of puting it on the nodes. Viewed in this light, 
any  didactic  model can  be regarded as relational (cf.  Lund,  2003).  Yet the 
term relational is used in a number of specific theoretical eforts, from which 
the  work of  German adult education researcher Wiltrud Gieseke (2007)  has 
been selected for the folowing section.  Gieseke explores the idea  of rela-
tional didactics from an adult education point of view. Furthermore, she thor-
oughly addresses the issue of emotions, which links her work to that of Ileris 
and others. 
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Keyword: Relation 
 
A relation describes what lies between two entities, such as a learner 
and a learning matter. The two entities may change while the relation-
ship remains the same. (If Paul is taler than Peter, for example, the re-
lationship won’t change if Paul grows even taler.) However, a change 
in the relationship necessarily means a change in at least one of the 
participating entities (e.g. a physical change of position or a mental 
change of convictions). Thus relations often are good tools for observ-
ing processes in which we expect changes to occur without knowing 
exactly where they may occur. 
 
Gieseke looks at diferent types of relations in educational situations. One is 
the relation between the learner and the learning mater; the other is the rela-
tion between the learner and any  kind  of society that forms a frame around 
learning situations. (The former resembles the approach  of  phenomenogra-
phy, because significant learning is seen as a process in which people change 
their views towards something.) The concept of relational didactics links both 
types of relations: 
Everything a human being cals learning throughout his life – usualy indicating a diferent 
perspective on things, a further insight, a new skil, a change or extension in the long run – 
relies on relationships that have been established or can be established. (Gieseke, 2007, p. 
216, own translation) 
When we look at the relation between the individual and the learning mater, 
we find that  Gieseke aims to  go  beyond the theoretical and  methodological 
boundaries that  often characterise  psychological approaches towards learn-
ing, and the traditional philosophies of behaviourism and cognitivism in par-
ticular. She states that, from a psychological point of view, learning does not 
deal with diferent constelations of teaching and learning in general, but with 
different levels of learning (ibid., p. 222). These levels are covered more or 
less separately  by  diferent learning theories.  Behaviourism, for example, 
mainly deals with learning processes related to the first two or three levels in 
the abovementioned hierarchy (see Figure 4). And although even behavioural 
psychology may legitimately claim that its theories do not end when it comes 
to  meaning, the  pedagogical  perspective assumed  here  provides a  different 
picture. Therefore Gieseke concludes that, from a pedagogical point of view, 
the struggle between different theories of learning is only a pseudo problem, 
as they only describe diferent types of learning. 
Within this line of thought, learning by an individual eventualy is consi-
dered to influence the whole person and, ultimately, society. Refering to the 
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German discussion, Gieseke contrasts her concept with that of Bildung (see 
also Chapter 7.1): 
Al participation in Bildung is an activity to change and to refine oneself. It has an impact 
on one’s general condition and the whole potential of activities and judgements which take 
efect in a society. (Gieseke, 2007, p. 37, own translation) 
Consequently, learning is rooted both in the individual and in the interaction 
between an individual and  others.  The later aspect  may cover the  whole 
range of others, from a single individual to the learning group and society as 
a whole. Therefore, learning may be defined as ‘a process of social exchange 
with more competent partners who enable us to reach new areas of develop-
ment ..’ (Rehrl & Gruber, 2007, p. 246, own translation). This idea is quite in 
line with classical philosophy: Aristotle, for example, saw society as the most 
powerful educator (cf. Göhlich & Zirfas, 2007, p. 66), and medieval philoso-
phers put it in similar terms (ibid., p. 71). It is at this point that Gieseke’s ap-
proach puts a specific focus on emotions. She emphasises that emotions are 
not only relevant for individual learning (fear, for example, tends to impede 
the acquisition of complex information), but even more so for modeling so-
cial interelation in learning processes. ‘Relations are .. emotionaly situated’ 
(Gieseke,  2007,  p.  229); they  provide ‘the  bridge to  other  people,  which 
enables communication’ (ibid., p. 15). Here, Gieseke argues against construc-
tivism. In  doing so, she is in  good company:  with the  discovery  of  miror 
neurons, recent research in  neuroscience (the  original  provenance  of con-
structivist theory)  has enriched  our understanding  of the epistemological 
processes that  occur in  human interaction (cf.  Galese,  2005;  Galese,  Key-
sers,  &  Rizzolati,  2004;  Pätzold,  2010a).  Overal,  Gieseke’s thoughts  pro-
vide a  more comprehensive insight into the role  of emotions in learning  on 
the  one  hand, and the  general idea  of relations as a core analytical  unit  of 
learning  processes  on the  other.  Folowing this analytical  perspective a  bit 
further leads us to logical models that try to capture the phenomenon of learn-
ing in al of its complexity while stil giving it a clear logical order. 
Exercises and tasks 
Exercise 1 
Try to  describe  – in  your  own  words  – aspects  of the relationship  between 
phenomenography (variation theory) and phenomenology. 
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Exercise 2 
Find examples from your own learning experience in which learning may be 
described as a change within a relationship. 
Task 1 
There are some  good  web resources to learn about  phenomenography.  At 
Phenomenology-Online, for example,  you  may start exploring some  of the 
basic terms in the ‘inquiry’ section,  which  presents a  variety  of  key terms 
such as ‘embodied knowledge’ or ‘vocatio’, as wel as more general informa-
tion on methods and procedures. After going through this material, you may 
want to revise your answers to Exercise 1. 
http:/www.phenomenologyonline.com 
Task 2 
The aforementioned article  by  Marton,  Dal’Alba, and  Beaty (see  below) 
provides an insight into aspects of the research methodology of phenomeno-
graphy. Read the article and discuss the opportunities and limitations of this 
research approach. Consider the complexity of learning and human develop-
ment  on the  one  hand, and the  objective  of  generalising research results  on 
the other. 
Marton, F., Dal’Alba, G., & Beaty, E. (1993). Conceptions of learning. Interna-
tional Journal of Educational Research, 19, 277–300. 
 
 
4.  Logical Models and Stages of Learning 
In  previous chapters,  we already came across a  number  of approaches that 
create  hierarchies  of learning (see  Figure  4, for example).  As there is  ob-
viously some  kind  of  general  principle  underlying those concepts,  we are 
going to investigate it further in this section. The core idea is to abstract from 
the particular learner and the particular content of learning to find a logical 
model  of levels  of learning.  Learning theory and formal logic  meet in two 
areas. On the one hand, there are several (mainly historical) contributions to 
logic  which can also  be read as contributions to learning theory (cf.  Koch, 
1988; Meyer-Drawe, 1996, 2003); on the other hand, concepts of formal log-
ic can be utilised to describe learning in a particular way. They can result in 
models of logical types of learning, of which Gregory Bateson’s (see below) 
might  be the  most  prominent.  Besides,  other concepts  of learning refer to 
formal logic (at least implicitly)  when they arange learning  processes in a 
hierarchy, as  we  have seen  with Ileris in  Chapter  2.  Similarly, concepts  of 
human development, such as Piaget’s, can be examined with respect to logi-
cal types. With Piaget, these concepts would include assimilation, accommo-
dation, and the various stages of human development. 
4.1  The relationship between logic and learning 
With respect to the  didactics  of adult education, the  German educational 
scientist Horst Siebert has caled for a distinction between the content-logic 
(Sachlogik) of the learning mater, the psycho-logic (Psychologik) of the lear-
ner, and other factors (see Siebert, 2010, p. 14). Content-logic, which corre-
sponds to the scientific system of a given discipline, is the result of a scientif-
ic discourse that involves more than just the respective experts. 
Example: From a content-logic point of view, it is reasonable to classify 
plants  by the  number  of their cotyledons (embryonic leaves) instead  of, for 
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example, the colour of their blossoms. Whereas the former is constant among 
al representatives of a genus (and beyond), the later may vary even within a 
single species.  Nevertheless, our  psycho-logic is  oriented at everyday expe-
rience, in which plants are usualy identified by their blossoms, and the time 
to count the cotyledons has long passed. An instructor teaching a course on 
plants who aims to integrate learners’ everyday experience is therefore wel 
advised to give room to the characteristics of blossom colour before provid-
ing other characteristics which may lead to deeper knowledge and eventualy 
help learners to differentiate a much higher number of plants. 
Although content-logic seems to  be superior from a scientific  point  of 
view, it often is not if we consider the learner’s process of acquiring knowl-
edge and competencies.  Furthermore, respecting the  perspective  of  psycho-
logic helps to decrease the knowledge gap between the learner and the teach-
er (which is  particularly  desirable in  most adult education setings).  Yet it 
must not be overlooked that the final aim of a course may often be to amend 
(and sometimes replace) popular knowledge with scientific knowledge and to 
make it accessible for informing learners’ decisions and judgements. 
Eventualy the diferent logics resemble the different perspectives on the 
phenomenon presented in the previous chapter. In both cases, we see a kind 
of transition from a simpler to a  more complex  view.  Learning, in  other 
words, refers to logic in addressing some kind of progress in which different 
stages of learning may stil be distinguished. 
4.2  Bateson’s levels of learning 
Gregory  Bateson, a  British anthropologist, social scientist, linguist, and cy-
berneticist,  designed a  widely acknowledged system  of learning levels in 
which levels are described from a purely formal point of view. According to 
Bateson, there are five diferent levels: 
Zero learning is characterized by specificity of response, which – right or wrong – is not 
subjected to corection. 
Learning I is change in specificity of response by corection of erors of choice within a set 
of alternatives. 
Learning I is change in the process of Learning I, e.g., a corective change in the set of al-
ternatives from which choice is made, or it is a change in how the sequence of experience 
is punctuated. 
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Learning II is change in the process of Learning I, e.g., a corective change in the system 
of sets of alternatives from which choice is made.. . 
Learning IV would be change in Learning II, but probably does not occur in any adult liv-
ing  organism  on this earth.  Evolutionary  process  has,  however, created  organisms  whose 
ontogeny brings them to Level II. (Bateson, 1972, p. 293) 
Learning 0, in other words, refers to a process in which someone or something 
(this level can be applied to machines as wel) responds to a given stimulus in a 
particular way without arguing about their response. This may occur, for exam-
ple, after animals have learned a new response to a stimulus in a behaviouristic 
seting.  The  English  word learning,  unlike its equivalents in  many  other lan-
guages, conveys this  particular  meaning in sentences such as, ‘I  have learned 
from the siren that a police car is approaching’ (ibid., p. 284). So Learning 0 is 
the repeated constant response to a particular stimulus (and, as the name zero 
learning suggests,  we  often  would  not cal this  process learning at al).  How-
ever, the resulting response may turn out to be wrong in the sense that it does 
not match a certain stimulus. We may, for example, mistake a burglar alarm for 
a police car siren and, reacting according to Learning 0 (e.g. turning around to 
see the  police car), find  out that there is  none. If  we, in that case, adjust  our 
reaction to that stimulus with respect to future situations, we have approached 
the level of Learning I. According to Bateson, behaviouristic conditioning is a 
very common case of Learning I. Instead of showing a certain reaction to a sti-
mulus (or none at al), the subject learns to react in alternative ways. Eventual-
ly,  Learning  0  has  undergone change, and the subject shows a  diferent (but 
again stable) reaction towards certain stimuli. 
Folowing this line  of analysis,  Learning I can  be seen as a change in 
Learning I – that is, at this stage, the learner becomes conscious of how his or 
her Learning I takes place, which ofers him or her the opportunity to actively 
change these paterns. Learning II therefore not only addresses the stimulus, 
but also  pays atention to the context in  which it appears, relating  more to 
manners, habits, and the like than to single stimuli. In our example, Learning 
II could mean for us not only to stop turning around whenever we hear a si-
ren, but to start thinking about what may have led us to our eroneous expec-
tation of a police car. We may investigate other similar sources of misunder-
standing and eventualy change our general concepts of warning sounds and 
how to deal with them. As Learning II means a change in Learning I, which 
is routinely understood as ‘normal’ learning, Learning II is regularly referred 
to as ‘learning to learn’ (Bateson, 1972, p. 292; Pätzold, 2010b). Bateson also 
introduced the term deutero-learning (cf.  Bateson,  1972,  p.  292;  Visser, 
2003), which means secondary learning. 
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Keyword: Deutero-learning 
 
Bateson’s term for second-order learning has been taken up in a varie-
ty of disciplines, particularly with respect to change management. The 
crucial idea is that learning processes themselves often require some 
kind of ‘supervision’ by the individual. In this respect, deutero-learning 
means to reflect (and change) individual learning processes according 
to organisational circumstances. However, in Bateson’s approach, the 
term denotes any type of learning that modifies Learning I. 
 
The last (regular) level in  Bateson’s  model formaly refers to a change  of 
Learning I, literaly a change in how learning to learn takes place. Obviously 
this is not a very common process. As Learning II chalenges learners’ most 
fundamental assumptions, it poses a serious threat to the stability of their every-
day routines, their routinised social relations, and, eventualy, their identity. 
Then again, there are situations in which it is desirable or even necessary to 
undergo such changes.  Learning II, therefore, is  usualy expected to take 
place in extraordinary situations such as psychotherapy, religious conversion, 
and the like. It is  dificult, if  not impossible, to find a consistent verbal  de-
scription of the process itself. This is one reason why it is useful to apply log-
ics to learning.  From a logical  point  of  view,  Learning II  means that the 
‘rules’ of Learning I, the learner’s character, and his or her self-experience 
as a learner become the subject of deliberate change. ‘Changing such habits 
involves a profound redefinition of a person’s character or self, the aggregate 
of  his  or  her  past  deutero-learning’ (Visser,  2003,  p.  276).  Bateson  himself 
stated that Learning II is rare and that he never observed any species other 
than humans going through this process. In fact, he added Learning II to his 
model only later; originaly, it consisted only of Levels 0 to 2. From a logical 
point of view, however, there is no limitation to a certain stage. Learning IV 
can logicaly be defined as learning of Learning II and so on. Bateson briefly 
mentions that Learning IV might be regarded as an interplay of ontogenesis 
(i.e. the  development  of an individual  organism from the earliest stages to 
maturity) and phylogenesis (i.e. the evolutionary development and diversifi-
cation of a species or group of organisms). In conclusion, the dificulties of 
imagining such a thing as Learning IV can be ilustrated by means of a ma-
thematical analogy: 
To get a feeling for Bateson’s perspective on levels of learning, we may 
compare them to Euclidean geometry. (Bateson himself did so, but the idea 
presented here is a bit diferent.) Let’s imagine Learning 0 as a single point 
(or a bit). It is either there or it isn’t, and its dimension is zero. Learning I, 
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then, equates a straight line. In geometry, and in a metaphorical sense as wel, a 
line is an object of dimension one. As Learning I ofers diferent but equivalent 
opportunities for zero learning, the  dots  on a line are  diferent,  but at the 
same time, they are al related to each other in the same fundamental relation-
ship. Consequently, Learning I may be seen as a two-dimensional plane. In 
contrast to a straight line, a plane provides the possibility for diferent lines. 
A single  dot (Learning  0 in  our  way  of speaking) can  be  part  of  different 
straight lines as reference systems  within the  overal system  of the  plane. 
From  here, it is  not too  difficult to imagine  Learning III as the three-
dimensional space in which diferent planes may emerge with or without in-
tersections. Based on our everyday experience, however, we find it much easi-
er to imagine  planes and their spatial features  because  we can  draw them. 
And for most people, it is a chalenging task to try to imagine, let alone de-
scribe, a ‘room’ of more than three dimensions. So in a way, Bateson’s model 
complies quite wel with our spatial experience, which may at least be used 
as a metaphor for the diferent levels of learning. 
Bateson’s levels of learning provide a kind of blueprint for other concep-
tions of puting learning processes into a hierarchy of complexity. Some ap-
proaches have already been mentioned, others, such as the concept of trans-
formative learning,  wil  be the subject  of later sections.  We should always 
keep in  mind,  however, that (adult) learners  may frequently experience  dif-
ferent stages of learning simultaneously. 
4.3  Alternatives to Bateson’s levels of learning 
Of course, there is a  variety  of  possibilities to  modify  or replace  Bateson’s 
model with other proposals. His purely logic and constructive approach may 
be replaced with a more empirical one, for example (as Piaget has done with 
respect to the development of thought and the two ‘levels’ of accommodation 
and assimilation). The descriptions of Bateson’s levels may be altered and re-
fined according to everyday learning situations to expand their rather tech-
nical focus. Even if we choose to folow the purely logical approach, we may 
try to apply alternative types of logic to the mater of learning to get different 
perspectives on learning in terms of conceptualisation and research. 
Although alternative types of logic are too complex to be explored in any 
depth here, we stil touch upon them briefly to ilustrate the point that uncon-
ventional thinking may lead to quite stimulating results. In the area of logical 
reasoning, for example, we may come across what is known as non-classical 
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logic. This branch of logic explores how our view on logical problems (and 
eventualy our whole rational thinking) changes when we – as a thought ex-
periment – disregard the logical rule that the answer to certain questions can 
only  be yes  or no.  The  German  philosopher and logician  Günther  Gothard 
(1991) introduced a third alternative, the rejection value (p. 61), which can be 
understood as a type of answer that rejects the question. With the help of this 
third answer  value, situations in  which a  question is  not appropriate  within 
the given context may be handled within the logical system. In a classroom 
situation, for example, in which the ‘feasible’ alternatives are (1) being able 
to learn or (2) not being able to learn, possible rejections might include (3.1) 
refusing to learn or (3.2) refusing to show what one has learned. Moreover, 
any interpretation  of this situation  wil  be inappropriate  unless those rejec-
tions are taken into account – as Luhmann has shown with respect to the edu-
cational system, for example (cf. Luhmann, 2004, p. 45). 
From among the  various alternations and alternatives to  Bateson’s tax-
onomy, we wil finaly highlight the Structure of the Observed Learning Out-
come (SOLO) taxonomy by Biggs and Colis (cf. Dahlgren, 2005). 
 
Keyword: SOLO taxonomy 
 
In a way reminiscent of the phenomenographic approach, the SOLO 
taxonomy lists learning outcomes in an empiricaly based hierarchy of 
five levels of understanding. The first level, caled pre-structural, de-
scribes the rejection or merely formal acquisition of what is learned. 
Items are learned, if at al, as disconnected bits. The second level, uni-
structural, involves a first generalisation of what is learned, but only 
with respect to a single aspect of the learning matter. The third level, 
multi-structural, involves generalisation with respect to several aspects. 
Whereas the first level resembles Learning 0 in Bateson’s model, the 
folowing two rather match Learning I. (We have to keep in mind, 
however, that now the focus is on the learner again, not on the learn-
ing process itself, as with Bateson.) The fourth level in the SOLO tax-
onomy is caled relational and is characterised by generalisations and 
inductive conclusions within a given or expected context. We may situ-
ate this level at the threshold from Learning I to Learning I in Bate-
son’s model. The fifth level, extended abstract, eventualy means de-
duction and induction within and beyond a given or expected context; 
in certain cases, it may be the equivalent of what Bateson characterised 
as Learning I. The SOLO taxonomy, as most other models of classroom-
based learning, does not address Learning II, which tends to be attri-
buted more to therapeutic contexts. 
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The logical approach shows that there can be productive exchange between 
formal logical concepts and empirical considerations of learning. The results 
of this exchange can  be  utilised in  various  ways.  For learning theory, it is 
immensely important to reflect on the analytical framework in which learning 
is conceptualised. As Gieseke pointed out, mixing up the contributions from 
different stages of the learning process in an unreflecting manner may result 
in dramatic misunderstandings and pointless debate. From a practical point of 
view, it may also be useful to observe one’s own learning processes with re-
spect to diferent levels of learning. Dificulties and resistance to learning, for 
example, often do not occur at the same level as the learning issue itself. Lite-
racy is a prominent example: research has shown that adults in certain living 
conditions may be able to learn how to read and write, but at the same time, 
they are often unable to apply these skils outside the classroom. Becoming 
literate seems to  have such a  dramatic impact  on their  overal situation that 
they are  virtualy  unable to  use their  newly acquired competencies (cf. 
Pätzold, 2004,  pp. 123–124).  We shal return to the practical  perspective in 
Part Two of this study guide. 
Exercises and tasks 
Exercise 1 
Find further examples  of the thresholds  between the  various learning levels 
according to Bateson. 
Exercise 2 
How would  you  describe the  diferent learning levels from a relational per-
spective (cf. Chapter 4)? 
Task 1 
Above,  we  used a  mathematical analogy to ilustrate the idea  of levels  of 
learning. The underlying model was that of a change in dimension, which is 
quite easy to describe but dificult to imagine. For a more in-depth introduc-
tion on how we perceive dimensions (and a few hours of inspiring reading), I 
recommend Edwin A. Abbot’s classic novela Flatland: A Romance of Many 
Dimensions (Abbot, n.d./1884). 
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Task 2 
Like  many  other  models, the  SOLO taxonomy is  primarily related to class-
room-based learning. Nevertheless, it should also be applicable to adult learn-
ing in formal, non-formal, and informal contexts. Review the taxonomy and 
identify the changes and amendments that may be necessary to apply it in any 
of those situations.  Haloway (n.d.)  gives a  brief  overview  of the concept; 
Biggs and Colis’s book is the primary source for the SOLO taxonomy. 
Haloway, W. (n.d.). Quality learning with reference to the SOLO model. 
Available from 
http:/www.une.edu.au/education/research/bhutan/publications/bhutan-solo-
haloway.pdf 
Biggs, J., & Colis, K. (1982). Evaluating the quality of learning: The SOLO tax-
onomy. New York: Academy Press. 
5.  Comprehensive Approaches 
5.1  Towards a comprehensive theory of learning? 
The theories presented up to this point have mainly focussed on specific di-
mensions of learning (the interplay between cognition and emotion, the rela-
tional perspective, etc.), but there are other authors who have tried to capture 
the entire phenomenon of learning in one single theory. Such proposals nec-
essarily  give the impression  of  being  quite eclectic.  As in  other areas  of 
knowledge, a single unifying theory of learning is not in sight. Nevertheless, 
comprehensive concepts sometimes provide good examples of middle range 
theories (Robert Merton). One of the best known approaches in this field is 
that of the British adult education researcher Peter Jarvis, who himself refers 
to  his  ongoing eforts as steps ‘towards a comprehensive theory  of  human 
learning’ (Jarvis, 2006). 
 
Figure 5: Kolb’s learning cycle 
 
Source: Excerpt from Figure 2.4, Kolb, 1984, p. 33; see also Bélanger, 2011, p. 41 
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Jarvis’s theory of learning originated in the 1980s, when he explored David 
Kolb’s learning cycle (Figure 5) in a series of investigations. In these expe-
riments, participants were given a printout of Kolb’s model and asked to alter 
it according to their own learning experience. The idea was to eventualy ar-
rive at a more comprehensive and practical model. Although Jarvis’s research 
would not satisfy modern methodological standards of qualitative research, it 
provided a good basis from which to further explore the processes of human 
learning from the actor’s perspective. (Besides, as an easy and stimulating 
way to reflect on one’s own learning experiences, Jarvis’s proposal may stil 
be used with great benefit in courses dealing with the learning of adults.) 
 
Figure 6: The process of learning 
Source: Jarvis, 1987, p. 26 
 
The results of Jarvis’s investigations are shown in Figure 6. Although the two 
models seem to be quite different at first sight, there are meaningful similari-
ties. 
• In both models, learning is basicaly conceived as a circular process (see 
also Figure 7). This conception refers to the notion of a learning episode, 
which is  quite common in  psychology, for example. It  may also  be re-
lated to concepts such as  Bateson’s (see above), in  which  punctuation 
plays an important role in observing learning. Moreover, it is important 
when it comes to embedding ‘smal’ learning processes in a broader con-
text, such as lifelong learning. 
•  Both  models feature the elements of experience, experimentation, and 
reflection. 
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•  Although both models are more or less circular, experience plays a promi-
nent role in  both. In  Kolb’s  model, it is  put  on top  of the circle. Jarvis 
puts it in the same position and, although many elements may or may not 
be part of the learning process, the element ‘situation/experience’ is in-
dispensable. 
These similarities notwithstanding, there are obvious diferences to be noted 
as wel. First, Jarvis’s model is a bit  more complicated (and therefore lacks 
the elegance of Kolb’s). This is due to the fact that, based on his respondents’ 
statements, he broke down some of Kolb’s steps into several parts. Further-
more, he added alternative paths between the various stages, alowing learn-
ers to bypass some of them or to go in circles within the model. Another im-
portant enhancement is the possibility for learners to go through part of the 
learning process without undergoing any particular change. In this case, Jar-
vis accordingly speaks of ‘non-learning’ (Jarvis, 2006, p. 10) – a possibility 
that is also considered in the  work  of Ileris (2003,  p.  403) and further  dis-
cussed in  Chapter  8 of this study  guide.  Of Jarvis’s  various amendments to 
Kolb’s  model, that  of  memorisation  deserves  particular  mention.  From a 
theoretical perspective, it is possible to represent the process of memorisation 
as a specific form of learning within Kolb’s model. Yet neither is it very ele-
gant to do so, nor  does it  do justice to the eminent role  of  memorisation in 
many everyday learning processes, both formal and informal. 
 
Keyword: Person 
 
The Latin origin of the term refers to the mask of an actor. In modern 
theory, however, a person is defined as the irresolvable unity of body 
and mind. 
 
In addition to refining Kolb’s model, Jarvis stresses one essential point about 
learning: it is always the person who learns. Consequently, the learner must 
be placed at the beginning and at the end of any model of learning. By that, 
Jarvis underscores the idea that learning has to be conceptualised with respect 
to the learner as a  person in the  world rather than to any  mental apparatus, 
cognitive system,  brain,  or  other entity.  This  outlook  goes  back to Jarvis’s 
early work on learning theory, but it has become even more important since. 
Thus Jarvis defines learning as 
the combination  of  processes  whereby the  whole  person  –  body (genetic,  physical and  bio-
logical) and  mind (knowledge, skils, atitudes,  values, emotions,  beliefs and senses): expe-
riences a social situation, the  perceived content  of  which is then transformed cognitively, 
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emotively or practicaly (or through a combination) and integrated into the person’s individual 
biography resulting in a changed (or more experienced) person. (Jarvis, 2006, p. 13) 
By placing the person at the centre, Jarvis is able to interpret other aspects of 
learning in  more abstract  ways than  most  psychological concepts.  At the 
same time, this approach is testimony to his background as a sociologist: he 
describes learning as a change of the person or the self (Finger & Asún, 2001, 
p. 51), folowing the tradition of George Herbert Mead’s symbolic interactio-
nism. Figure 7 shows Jarvis’s view of a person’s transformation through learn-
ing. In its emphasis on the temporal change of the person rather than on the 
details  of learning (or  non-learning), it is  obviously  quite  different from 
Kolb’s learning cycle. 
 
Figure 7: A learning episode as the transformation of a person 
 
Source: Jarvis, 2006, p. 23 
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With this model, Jarvis joins those theorists who emphasise that learning is a 
transformative process, even though his concept of transformation is a bit dif-
ferent than Mezirow’s, for example. Whereas the later sees transformational 
learning as a particular type of learning (see Chapter 2.2), Jarvis thinks of any 
kind of learning as a process that involves changing as a person, and there-
fore as a transformative incident. Again, it is the person that is at the core of 
his interest in learning. 
Although Jarvis designed the model depicted in Figure 7 as a folow-up 
to  his earlier approaches, its  potentiality to  deliver a  beter  description  of 
adult learning processes seems doubtful. We do not have to regard it as ri-
valing earlier approaches, however. Rather, the model in Figure 7 shows a 
person-centred concept  of learning in  which the change  of the  person is 
predominant, and in which other aspects of the learning process are subor-
dinated to that  particular  perspective.  Whereas the concept  of transforma-
tional learning considers the transformation of the person to be part of the 
learning process, Jarvis’s model takes the opposite approach by describing 
the learning  process as a  particular type  of  personal change.  With that in 
mind, Jarvis delivers a complimentary look on learning rather than an alter-
native. 
His concept  of learning is rather  precise, especialy  with respect to the 
definition quoted above. It describes learning as the change of the person. On 
other occasions, he situated this change within the lifeworld (cf. Jarvis, 2006, 
pp. 194ff.). In a more recent book (Jarvis, 2009), he explored these ideas in 
more  detail,  partly returning to a sociological  point  of  view and further in-
vestigating social  perspectives such as interaction. These conceptions are of 
particular importance when learning is defined as a ‘change of the person in 
the  world’ (Pätzold,  2008).  This  perspective leads to three crucial characte-
ristics of a comprehensive pedagogical concept of learning: 
•  Learning is change.  Therefore, it is a  process to  be  observed in time. 
Theoretical and empirical concepts  of learning  have to construct some 
virtual or real diference between a status quo ante and a status quo post 
in the experience of learning (see also Chapter 9.1). 
•  At the core of learning is the person. Learning theory must consider al 
aspects of the person, including mind and body, and must not neglect any 
aspects  of this  unity.  Eventualy, this leads to the  phenomenological 
perspective referred to as the lived body (see also Chapter 9.2). 
•  Learning is situated in the world – again conceived as a unity of what is 
given materialy and what is experienced mentaly or socialy. Therefore, 
learning always has to do with a relationship between the person and the 
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world. From a phenomenological point of view, this leads to the idea of 
the lifeworld (see also Chapter 9.3). 
We wil come back to those three issues in Part Two, when discussing their 
consequences for didactics. Before doing so, we should assess Jarvis’s con-
cept a litle further.  Though  doubtlessly an important contribution to the 
theory  of adult learning, it stil leaves some  questions for further research. 
First, the empirical basis is rather weak. In contrast to concepts such as phe-
nomenography (see  Chapter  3.1),  which involve a comprehensive theory as 
wel as  detailed and  diligent empirical studies, Jarvis’s theory  of  human 
learning is  more suitable for contributing to the ‘big  picture’.  His research 
approach  has  proved fruitful for exploring an individual’s  perspectives  on 
learning, but it is not (and was not meant to be) sufficient for providing an in-
depth analysis of general processes of human learning. This also holds for the 
various learning paths that Jarvis has discussed against this background (Jar-
vis, 2006, pp. 10ff.). They may often be seen as inspiring metaphors, but we 
should not expect them to form a comprehensive system of possible learning 
paths. 
The second model, shown in Figure 7, provides a more or less metatheo-
retical perspective. The concept of the person can be exploited to enrich pe-
dagogical learning theory, but it itself lacks a systematic framework of refer-
ence within or outside educational science. Yet it may serve wel as a back-
ground for interpretation, when relations between learning and lifeworld are 
discussed, for example. 
In his ongoing work, Jarvis keeps creating an often inspiring and some-
times surprising mix of contributions to learning theory. His thinking draws 
on a diverse range of sources including philosophy (ranging from Confucius 
through  Husserl to  Foucault),  psychology (with an emphasis  on  Piaget,  but 
further references to Freud, Dewey, and many others), and a variety of other 
references. His early  work in  particular  was so strongly related to symbolic 
interactionism that it was regarded as the ‘translation of symbolic interactio-
nism into a model of adult learning’ (Finger & Asún, 2001, p. 51). More re-
cent publications feature strong links to phenomenology, adding yet another 
perspective to Jarvis’s thinking. 
Jarvis  obviously  doesn’t aim to literaly  bind al those contributions to-
gether to form a consistent and comprehensive theory; instead, he uses them 
as a repository of inspiring thoughts on the overal topic. In doing so, he pro-
vides a unique body of work that raises our awareness of the connections be-
tween  diferent theoretical perspectives  on learning, thereby creating a  kind 
of  network  of ideas  without sticking to  one  particular school  of thought. 
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However, two of these schools are so important and had such a strong impact 
(not just on Jarvis’s thinking) that they deserve to be discussed in this study 
guide. 
5.2  Humanism and pragmatism: The roots and branches of 
modern learning theory? 
In 2001, Mathias Finger and Jóse Manuel Asún wrote that adult education is 
at a crossroads. Over the past couple of decades, it has increasingly evolved 
into a support structure for the (mainly industrial)  development  of societies 
and economies.  Although this implies  great success in terms  of scope and 
impact and  has led to  numerous  positive  developments (e.g. increasing the 
number of adult education providers, establishing structures of public funding 
for adult education, recognising adult education as an academic subject, etc.), 
it may stil turn out to be a dead end. Finger and Asún fear that, strangled by 
its own success, adult education may grow out of touch with its roots and tra-
ditions, particularly the ethical agenda it once started out with. They refer to 
Ivan Ilich, the great educational thinker (and doer) from Latin America, who 
became aware of this danger early on: 
More than ever before, his thinking is relevant today, as the very idea of ‘sustainable’ in-
dustrial development goes up in smoke, while al its sustaining institutions try to survive .. 
and make things worse in doing so. (Finger & Asún, 2001, p. 3) 
Echoing Ilich’s warning, Finger and Asún aim to bring adult education back 
in line with the unique contribution it can make to society as long as it is not 
co-opted by particular institutions, sectors, or interests. To help adult educa-
tion return to its fundamental traditions, they identify two main roots of adult 
education  philosophy,  which they  believe  may serve as  pivotal streams  of 
thinking:  humanism and  pragmatism.  The folowing sections are loosely 
based on their enthusiastic praise of these two schools of thought. To Finger 
and  Asún,  pragmatism is a ‘genuine  American  highway’ (ibid.,  p.  29), and 
humanism no less than a ‘lonely traveler on the road to heaven’ (ibid., p. 62). 
Both  philosophies  have in common that they  –  unlike the  majority  of con-
temporary contributions to educational philosophy – are based on a particular 
set of anthropological assumptions about humans as learners that lie beneath 
their practical conclusions. 
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Keyword: Pragmatism 
 
Pragmatism is both a general philosophical approach and a specific ap-
proach in the philosophy of education. With respect to the former, it 
can basicaly be understood as a kind of constructive reflection on the 
philosophy of idealism. Whereas idealism is more or less related to 
European philosophy, pragmatism is an American contribution to phi-
losophical discourse. 
 
It is a popular misunderstanding to regard ‘pragmatic action’ as action with-
out theory. What the pragmatic approach opposes, however, is theory without 
action. With its popular claim that ‘truth is what works’ (Skirbekk & Gilje, 
2001,  p.  362),  pragmatism is related  both to  behaviourism and to a certain 
understanding of constructivism. However, pragmatism also has a chaleng-
ing  moral  background. John  Dewey,  one  of the foremost representatives  of 
this educational and philosophical paradigm, is acknowledged as a relentless 
advocate of democracy, and one of his most famous books is devoted to the 
relationship between democracy and education (Dewey, 1916). Other repre-
sentatives of pragmatism include Eduard Lindemann and Wiliam James. 
 
Figure 8: A learning cycle according to John Dewey; for an alternative 
suggestion, review Kolb’s model in Figure 5 
Source: Finger & Asún, 2001, p. 33 
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According to Dewey, learning is part of a larger process of growth, which is 
an intrinsic human potentiality. Humans are characterised by their ability to 
use language and to learn from previous experience (and, moreover, to build 
on this learning and thereby reach higher levels of both individual and social 
development).  Therefore,  while also serving social and economic  needs, 
learning in its essence shal contribute to  humanisation and  progress. In a 
learning cycle based on Dewey’s philosophy, humans are habitualised (socia-
lised) to their environment because of their prior experience. This habituation 
produces habits (social beliefs, norms, values, and cultures). These habits in 
turn lead to new actions that bring about new experiences, thereby alowing 
the process to continue indefinitely (see Figure 8). 
Dewey’s philosophy draws our atention to the close link between learn-
ing and culture. As learning requires a stepwise process of leaving dysfunc-
tional  habits  behind and  developing new ones, rigid societies  often  obstruct 
further  development at  both the social and the individual levels.  Likewise, 
orienting education merely towards economic goals imposes too many limits 
on open development. Accordingly, education serves three main purposes: 
• It prepares individuals for finding their place and geting involved in the 
society they live in. 
• It creates and maintains a potentiality to foster innovation and creativity 
(including innovations to change society). 
• It is action in and of itself, designed to help the individual and society in 
general evolve and, specificaly, to enhance their problem-solving ability. 
From this point of view, education is a core process for maintaining and de-
veloping society itself. It can  only  be  used to support social  development, 
however, not to shape it or to give it a particular direction. As innovation and 
problem-solving potential refer to yet unknown future situations and abilities, 
their content cannot be foreseen. As a consequence, they cannot be anticipa-
ted in curicula, fixed  programmes  of adult education,  or similar steering 
measures. 
Another important aspect  of  Dewey’s approach (and  of  pragmatism in 
general) is  his emphasis  on experience. Individual learning is  based  on the 
reflection of experience and the coresponding action. Similarly, learning in 
societies must be open to colective endeavour to minimise the danger of sub-
jectivity in reflection. Individual learners  need the colective as a source  of 
experience in a  way that alows them to change their concepts,  beliefs, and 
convictions.  Experience  does  not  necessarily  mean the complete failure  of 
such a concept; rather, learners may experiment with it by engaging in a col-
lective discussion before actualy puting it to practice. 
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With respect to the philosophies presented thus far, pragmatism serves as a 
link  between  quite  diferent strands  of theory.  Not  only  does it connect  be-
haviourism and constructivism, it also  has  much in common  with  other con-
cepts mentioned here. Both Dewey and Jarvis, for example, focus on the indi-
vidual, defined as a person in society (cf. Jarvis, 2009). Dewey put experience 
at the centre of his learning theory, as did many others afterwards. And despite 
his practical approach, Dewey never lost sight of the moral foundations of edu-
cation. At this point, it even seems doubtful whether it is wise to folow Finger 
and Asún in their distinction between pragmatist and humanist approaches to-
wards adult education. As pragmatist thought is based on an anthropology that 
clearly regards humans as social beings with a certain urge to grow and devel-
op, it may be seen as closely akin to humanist theory in a certain sense. These 
similarities notwithstanding, humanist theory is also remarkably diferent from 
pragmatism, both regarding its core ideas and its main representatives. 
 
Keyword: Humanism 
 
The origins of humanism go far back in history. Originaly, the term re-
ferred to the historical period that folowed the Middle Ages and 
ushered in modernity (Rabil, n.d.). Humanist philosophers such as Pe-
trarch or Erasmus of Rotterdam revived ancient Greek and Roman 
thought, proclaiming the ideal of universal education and knowledge, 
and generaly placed human beings at the centre of al philosophical 
consideration. 
 
The work of humanist philosophers was devoted to improving people’s histori-
cal and social conditions and to promoting the free development of creative and 
constructive human powers. Humanist thinking in the modern social sciences, 
particularly in education and  psychology,  has reflected this  period in  various 
ways. In the eighteenth century, with the German discourse on Bildung in ful 
swing, Wilhelm von Humboldt refered to humanist thinking when champion-
ing the idea  of a  wel-rounded education and  defending it against those  who 
saw schooling and education as a  merely utilitarian enterprise to produce stu-
dents that satisfied certain social or economic demands. He thereby fostered the 
idea of a general type of learning, one that was not tied to specific uses and ap-
plications (which is why Humboldt may be regarded as an early advocate of the 
concept of key competencies). As Humboldt and others refered to the human-
ist philosophers, their approach is sometimes caled neo-humanism. 
In the mid-twentieth century, the term humanistic was applied to a varie-
ty  of  mainly  psychological approaches that  were  more  or less  based  on the 
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work of Carl Ransom Rogers. (Other representatives include Abraham Mas-
low, Erich Fromm, and Ruth Cohn, for example.) Like pragmatism, humanis-
tic psychology endorses a particular perspective on humans that, according to 
Rogers, can  be summarised in three  main assumptions (cf.  Finger  &  Asún 
2001, pp. 58f.; see also Bélanger, 2011): 
•  Human beings are active, free, and good. 
•  Humans have an intrinsic motivation to develop. 
•  Whether humans activate and realise their urge to develop is deeply in-
fluenced by their material and social circumstances. 
Despite reports to the contrary, the humanistic position is not merely a naïve 
belief in the goodness of every human being. Rogers and many other repre-
sentatives  of  humanistic  psychology  were  practising  psychotherapists and 
knew quite a bit about the abysses of human nature. Yet they were convinced 
that it  was  misleading to regard these  dark sides as ‘normal’; instead,  psy-
chology and  psychotherapy should strive to (re-)activate the  potentialities 
named above. 
Although the founders  of this  branch  of  humanism  were  psychologists, 
there soon was a growing number of contributions from education, not least 
because many of the humanistic psychologists were quite interested in educa-
tional questions. The posited process of individual development and growth 
has so much in common with concepts of learning that it cannot be easily dis-
tinguished from change  processes restricted to therapeutic intervention. 
Regers  himself said the  diference  between the two  was  merely a  mater  of 
the context in which they occur. In other words, the core ideas of humanistic 
psychology can be transferred to humanistic education mostly without altera-
tions.  More specificaly,  both rely  on ‘human-centeredness, a sense  of  per-
sonal autonomy, the idea of human dignity, the principle of virtuous action, 
and a sense  of  personal responsibility’ (Pearson  &  Podeschi,  1999,  pp.  43–
44). 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the humanistic approach was quite popu-
lar in education. Part of its atractiveness lies in the fact that it provides a posi-
tive  view  of  humans  while stil  ofering concrete approaches for intervention. 
Most importantly, it regards learning as something that  humans  generaly  do 
not have to be forced to do – instead, there is a natural urge to learn which only 
needs to be channeled into the desired direction. To be sure, humanistic educa-
tion theory has also drawn a lot of criticism, mainly regarding the lack of em-
pirical evidence for large parts of the concept (even though this is a typical fea-
ture of a considerable number of theories of that time). Some fundamental con-
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cepts of humanistic psychology, including such popular ideas as Maslow’s hier-
archy of needs, stil lack proof in terms of empirical research. 
Then again, many humanistic beliefs lately seem to be validated in other 
ways, for example by findings in neuroscience. The importance of emotions, 
for example, not only with regard to motivation but also with regard to actual 
learning  outcomes,  was  highlighted in the humanistic concept and has been 
confirmed through a  variety  of alternative eforts in learning research.  The 
general approach of self-directedness in learning has also gained significant 
importance in both research and practice. Admitedly, there are no simple and 
superior humanistic didactic arrangements – but then again, even behaviour-
ists, with their vast body of empirical evidence, cannot claim to have devised 
such general methods or setings. 
The idea of self-directedness in learning is one of the key contributions 
of humanistic psychology to education. For instance, it has become an essen-
tial component in the  American approach  of andragogy (Knowles,  1975; 
Knowles, Holton, & Swanson, 2005). 
 
Keyword: Andragogy 
 
Perpetuating the idea of human centring, andragogy focuses on learn-
ing as a fundamentaly individualised process that may be ‘facilitated’, 
to use one of Rogers’s terms, rather than ‘conducted’ through teach-
ing. Self-directed learning means that learners are autonomous 
throughout the whole process of controling their learning (without 
necessarily refusing help from others). Thus humanism, on the one 
hand, contributes to a particular understanding of learning as a self-
logical process; on the other hand, like pragmatism, it addresses an 
ethical dimension in basing any individual learning effort on the strife 
for growth and development. 
 
What  pragmatism and  humanism  have in common is the  proposition that 
learning is more than a means to a certain end; rather, it is a manifestation of 
humanity itself.  Whereas  pragmatism emphasises the social  dimension 
(learning prepares individuals for finding their place and geting involved in 
society),  humanism emphasises the individual  dimension (learning is, first 
and foremost, a necessary means to preventing the individual from being ex-
ploited  by society).  Both concepts further share the idea  of learning as a 
process related to persons. It would not be possible, therefore, to formulate a 
theory  of learning  organisations  or  machines in line  with the  original con-
cepts of pragmatist or humanist learning. (Modern theories on learning orga-
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nisations refer to those concepts, of course, but they would not simply trans-
fer them.) Moreover, by proposing specific ideas about learning, both prag-
matism and humanism have at least partly similar consequences for teaching. 
Pragmatism emphasises the importance of experience, but humanistic learn-
ing can hardly be imagined without experience either, especialy because the 
teacher’s role is that of a facilitator. Accordingly, both theories would claim 
that learning, at least to a certain extent, relies on a social counterpart. Final-
ly, both theories suggest that the outcomes of learning cannot and should not 
be systematicaly  determined in advance,  because this  would contradict the 
general openness of the process. Looking at the differences between the two 
approaches, we see that pragmatism has more of a social perspective whereas 
humanism is  more concerned  with the individual.  Accordingly,  pragmatism 
tends to place more emphasis on the measurable results of learning, whereas 
humanism tends to leave this assessment to the individual and therefore is 
less suitable for traditional empirical research. 
Humanism and  pragmatism  belong to the  very foundations  of  modern 
thinking in adult education. Their impact on adult education theory continues 
to today, and  both  philosophies are revisited  on a regular  basis every time 
new findings in educational science and  neighbouring  disciplines emerge. 
They may very wel be regarded as the roots of contemporary adult education 
theory, because in contrast to the sociological ‘classics’ (such as Foucault or 
Bourdieu, for example), they have something more particular to say about in-
dividual learning.  Yet they also  provide an anthropological and ethical  di-
mension, which is often absent in modern discussions on learning, teaching, 
and adult education in general. While seeking to create a thorough picture of 
what constitutes learning, they do not lose sight of the theoretical foundations 
from which they started: learning as a change process of societies and indi-
viduals.  This  perspective eventualy cals for ideas about  what these 
processes may lead to. Ultimately, such ideas cannot escape being influenced 
by  normative  positions, a fact that  humanism and  pragmatism  do  not  deny. 
Contemporary contributions to learning theory, and even  more to teaching 
methodology, should be aware that from a certain stage onwards, it is neces-
sary to  use and reflect  upon their  underlying  normative  presumptions.  The 
presumptions  of  humanism and  pragmatism are certainly  not the  only  ones 
out there, but they may serve to remind us of the necessity of normative re-
flection. Therefore, humanism and pragmatism may not only be regarded as 
roots but also as branches of modern learning theory. 
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Exercises and tasks 
Exercise 1 
Use Kolb’s learning cycle as a starting point to design your own concept of 
learning. Change phases, lines, and arows to create a model that seems ap-
propriate for describing the diversity of your own learning processes. At the 
same time, be careful not to make the model too abstract. 
Exercise 2 
Think about other schools of philosophy besides humanism and pragmatism. 
Is there something you might want to consider from a philosophical point of 
view when thinking about learning? 
Task 1 
Use Internet resources to find  out about  Kolb’s ‘learning style inventory’. 
Look at the coresponding tests and  maybe try them  yourself.  Discuss the 
concept (and the test results) with respect to your own ideas about (your own) 
learning. The folowing links are online adaptations of the Learning Style In-
ventory. Please keep in mind that they are only intended to give an impres-
sion of Kolb’s original work. 
http:/www.nwlink.com/~donclark/hrd/styles/learn_style_survey.html 
http:/www.cadplan.com.au/KolbOnline.html 
Task 2 
If  you explored Kolb’s learning style inventory (Task 1), you wil  have en-
countered the terms accommodator and assimilator. Find out about Piaget’s 
idea of those two terms. 
Task 3 
When  discussing the  work  of  Peter Jarvis,  we refered to  Robert  Merton’s 
term middle range theory. What did Merton himself mean by it? Have a look 
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at Merton (1957) and discuss whether the middle range approach is appropri-
ate for a theory of adult learning, or whether adult learning deserves a broader 
(or narower) theoretical approach. 
Merton, R. (1957). The role-set: Problems in sociological theory. British Journal 
of Sociology, 8(2), 106–120. Retrieved from 
http:/www.jstor.org/stable/587363?seq=2. 
 

6.  Looking Beyond One’s Own Nose: Psychological 
Approaches and Neurosciences 
6.1  A brief glance at behaviourism, cognitivism, and 
constructivism 
In  most  books about learning theory  or educational  psychology, readers 
sooner  or later encounter  wel-known terms such as  behaviourism, cogniti-
vism, constructivism, and so forth. For a long time, these approaches, in their 
atempt to capture a virtualy invisible process, have served as a kind of para-
mechanical theory  of the learning  process itself.  Although  human learning 
can never be observed directly – we can see a change in somebody’s beha-
viour, but we usualy cannot be sure about the reason for this change – these 
approaches were models for describing either the ‘phenomenological’ (beha-
viourism)  or the ‘internal’ (cognitivism, constructivism) aspects  of the 
process. 
Behaviourism, for example,  describes mechanisms  of learning  basicaly 
as building up chains of stimulus and response. In doing so, the theory pro-
vides a  model for  predicting the  outcome  of a certain treatment towards a 
learning entity, usualy a human being or an animal. Combining, for example, 
an aversive stimulus  with a  neutral  one  wil, after a  while,  usualy result in 
avoidance as a reaction to the formerly  neutral stimulus.  Yet the  model  be-
comes increasingly complicated  when it comes to those  kinds  of learning 
processes that involve learning a complex  mater  by rather indirect action 
(such as discussion, observation, modeling, etc.) or learning something new 
al at  once  – that is,  without a repeated sequence  of stimuli and responses. 
The former problem in particular is caused by an a priori theoretical decision 
that initialy contributed much to the success of behaviourism: the decision to 
disregard the cognitive system itself.  The famous term black  box is a  me-
taphor for the inaccessibility of a cognitive system, even though early beha-
viourists seem not to have used the term themselves. 
 
 
 
 
56 
Keyword: Black Box 
 
The term black box refers to an entity which can be examined only in-
directly by providing certain inputs and evaluating the output. By 
means of experiment and observation, one may find out what a black 
box does (i.e. what kind of reaction it shows to a certain input under 
certain circumstances). Its inner workings, however, are inaccessible – 
that is, how the black box works is mere speculation. 
 
As internal states are not accessible, learning by talking is generaly dificult 
to capture. Discussions about how somebody ‘feels’ when ‘experiencing’ this 
or that, or about the ‘judgements’ this person would eventualy make, is basi-
caly talk about internal states and – although it obviously may be part of a 
learning process – quite dificult to deal with in behaviouristic terms. Beha-
viourists therefore, instead of claiming direct access to people’s thoughts, be-
liefs, and so on, insist that we draw conclusions exclusively from observing 
someone’s  behaviour.  This assumption  proved fruitful  during the  develop-
ment of behaviourism, but it later turned out to be an obstacle, as seen above. 
Although researchers  generaly agree that internal conditions (such as 
motivation, lust, etc.) cannot be observed directly, it stil seems necessary to 
assume the existence of these conditions to gain an understanding of learning, 
defined as a change in behaviour. This is why cognitivism eventualy ended 
the hegemony of behaviourism as a dominant school of thought in psycholo-
gy. To a great extent, this is owed to the inspiring pioneer work of the Swiss 
psychologist and  development theorist Jean  Piaget. In contrast to the  beha-
viourists,  Piaget formed a sophisticated system  of central internal concepts 
and developed creative and demonstrative experiments to find out when and 
how these concepts are formed by children. A prominent example is the con-
cept of object permanence. Piaget stated that toddlers at the age of about ten 
months start to realise that objects do not just disappear when they are out of 
sight, but stay in (invisible) existence. From this moment onwards, much to 
many parents’ dismay, it is no longer possible to distract a child’s atention 
from some object just by covering it. Though the respective behaviour (e.g. 
searching for the object) is observable, the concept of object permanence it-
self is not. Whereas behaviourism basicaly aims to provide a kind of model 
for  predicting  behaviour, cognitivism seeks to find theoretical explanations 
for  why  particular learning tasks can  be accomplished (whereas  others can-
not). Furthermore, it ties those explanations to the developmental stage an in-
dividual is in. Therefore, cognitivism also directs our atention to the ways in 
which learning processes change throughout an individual’s development. 
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Figure 9: A schematic comparison of behaviourism and cognitivism 
 
Source: own source 
 
Figure  9 compares  both strands  of thought in a rather  broad-brush  manner, 
pointing out their differences in emphasis while also showing a considerable 
degree of overlap in each of the three dimensions indicated in the figure. Yet 
we can see that the approach of behaviourism is more on the inductive side, 
more related to empirical research, and  of greater generality than cogniti-
vism. Compared to behaviourism, cognitivism provides a more sophisticated 
theory and more details about human learning in particular. This explains an 
important observation concerning  practitioners  who  deal with  both theories. 
Whereas the theoretical assumptions are  quite  diferent and can  barely  be 
harmonised, the two theories  may  very  wel  be applied in combination in 
practical situations. We may often find a practitioner explaining one part of a 
learner’s  behaviour in  behaviourist terms and another in cognitivist terms  – 
as in the statement, ‘Because of the positive feedback she received, she made 
even  more  of an efort;  now she finaly  understood the issue.’  Whereas the 
first part refers to an observable positive stimulus and its consequence (and 
thus to behaviour), the second deals with the internal concept of understand-
ing something.  Yet  once again, the stimulus itself,  positive feedback, can 
hardly  be  understood  without referring to inner states.  So  despite their  pro-
found  diferences in theory, cognitivism and  behaviourism  merely seem to 
look at the same subject from  diferent angles.  Both approaches try to con-
tribute to a theoretical framework  of ‘mechanisms’ that lie  beneath the 
process of learning. 
Whereas behaviourism and cognitivism are both firmly rooted in the his-
tory of psychology, constructivism, a third major branch of learning theory, 
evolved out of sociology, biology, cybernetics, and other disciplines. Taken 
together, the various contributions from these fields form the family of con-
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structivist approaches: social constructivism (cf. Berger & Luckmann, 1966), 
radical constructivism (cf. von Glasersfeld, 1995), or other branches of sys-
temic-constructivist thinking (cf. Arnold, 2005, pp. 65–66). Al of them have 
in common that they regard somebody’s  world  view as an individual con-
struction resulting from the internal  processing  of information  – a  point  of 
view they  more  or less share  with cognitivism. (Glasersfeld in  particular 
based a good deal of his own thinking on the work of Piaget.) Yet whereas 
cognitivism emphasises the  mutual  paterns  of learning and  development, 
constructivism seeks to shed light on the question why, in spite of the inevi-
table individual diferences in constructing a world view, we end up with the 
impression that other people’s conceptions of the world seem to be quite simi-
lar to our own.  This is expressed in the fact that constructivism is  often re-
garded as an epistemology (and therefore as being closer to the individual’s 
cognisance),  whereas cognitivism is related to  development, emphasising 
general paterns above and beyond the individual. This has consequences for 
the whole scientific approach underlying the concept of learning and the re-
lated research. The fact that constructivists, and radical constructivists in par-
ticular, are quite reluctant to accept that any kind of objective, material outer 
world exists leads to significant diferences in the way they address the phe-
nomenon  of learning.  Whereas  behaviourism and cognitivism  differ  only in 
the weight they put on empiricism or theory, constructivism essentialy cals 
for an alternative  philosophy  of science.  Accordingly, the terms induction 
and deduction  hardly apply,  because  both  of these  principles are  based  on 
some kind of generaly valid truth. Consequently, the generality of the field 
of application, which started to decrease from behaviourism to cognitivism, is 
now lost completely: radical constructivist statements cannot be generalised 
in any reliable  way.  The chalenges  of formulating a theory  of learning ac-
cording to radical constructivism are shown in Figure 10. 
While the chalenges of (radical) constructivism to the traditional philos-
ophy of science shal not be denied, more moderate strands of constructivist 
thinking have already had a profound impact on pedagogy, both with regard 
to the theory of learning and a wide range of didactic considerations, mainly 
in the field of media education. 
Overal, the  psychological approaches (and constructivism as a related 
one) seek to explain the general  processes that  underlie learning. In this re-
spect, they are comparable to the  natural sciences,  which try to reveal the 
natural laws that form the  basis  of physical, chemical, or  biological  occur-
rences.  Education researchers sometimes  use the respective results in the 
same way that engineers exploit findings from physics: to develop, try out, or 
justify specific concepts, treatments, and the like. For a long time, it seemed 
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that the natural sciences on the one hand and the ‘mind sciences’ on the other 
could not become more equivalent, as there was no hint that it may be possi-
ble to  deal  with  mental  phenomena in a  way similar to the  way  natural 
sciences treat material phenomena. In recent decades, however, that expecta-
tion has been disproved by the immense progress made in the field of neuros-
cience within a short period of time. The folowing section provides an intro-
duction to neuroscience and its implications for learning theory. 
 
Figure 10: A comparison between cognitivism/behaviourism and construc-
tivism 
 
Source: own source 
6.2  The learning brain? 
The basic concepts of behaviourism entered the field of learning and teaching 
at a time  of  great expectations and  optimism that  bordered  on fantasies  of 
omnipotence. One of the immediate visible results was the creation of a con-
cept caled programmed instruction in the late 1950s (cf. Bulock, 1978). As 
behaviourists succeeded in teaching animals to  perform rather complex ac-
tions by cueing them in a series of stimuli-response-frames, it seemed prom-
ising to transfer this approach to human learners and find an eficient and re-
liable way of teaching virtualy anything to anybody. It seemed that the very 
laws  of learning  had  been revealed and  were  now at  hand to revolutionise 
learning and teaching.  History  has  proven this expectation  wrong: some  of 
the seemingly  new insights  were already  widely  used  by  practitioners (like 
enforcing  desired  behaviour),  others  were applicable  only  within a limited 
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area.  Gradualy, expectations  were reduced, and eventualy  behaviourism 
found its place among other approaches in learning theory and didactics. Sur-
prisingly, the picture seems quite similar when we look at today’s progress in 
neuroscience.  There are loads  of articles and  books  promising a revolution 
once again, this time based on findings in the brain, the material apparatus of 
thinking.  Level-headed commentators,  however,  keep advising against sim-
plifying applications  of the results from  neuroscience.  Cognitive  neuro-
science  – the combined study  of cognitive  processes, the  human  brain, and 
neuronal structures – 
is an exciting and new scientific endeavour, but it is also a very young one. As a result we 
know relatively litle about learning, thinking, and remembering at the level of brain areas, 
neural circuits,  or synapses;  we  know  very litle about  how the  brain thinks, remembers, 
and learns. (Bruer, 2008, p. 53) 
Bruer convincingly cals for restraint in puting neuroscience knowledge into 
practice, and yet there are a number of conclusions to be drawn from recent 
developments in this area with respect to the theory of learning and teaching. 
There is no reason to reduce our concepts of mental processes to what can be 
explained by the underlying neuronal activity; however, neither must we ig-
nore the existing knowledge of the material side of mental activity. From the 
various examples of what neuronal processes and structures may have to do 
with learning, the discussion on miror neurons shal be presented in a litle 
more  detail.  Basicaly,  miror  neurons are a specific type  of  nerve cel that 
shows activity when somebody observes a certain action, image, and so on. 
The crucial point is that they do not reside in those areas of the brain where 
the coresponding actions  or images are expected to  be  perceived; instead, 
they are found in those areas that are used to perform an action or produce a 
feeling similar to the one observed. 
Up until now, the majority of research in this area has been done on mo-
tor mirror neurons. They happen to show activity when we observe someone 
else perform an action that we could have also performed ourselves. In ani-
mal experiments, it has been shown that a monkey’s mirror neurons are ac-
tive when it observes another monkey grasping a peanut. Again, the impor-
tant detail here is that those neurons are located in the motor area of the mon-
key’s brain; that is to say, the same neurons are active when the monkey it-
self grasps a peanut. They are the first neurons to be discovered in the motor 
area that participate in a process of recognition. Moreover, if the monkey ob-
serves the same  movement as  before,  but  without the  peanut  being there to 
grasp, the neurons stay silent. It seems that those mirror neurons are realising 
the aim of a particular movement in a pre-conscious way (cf. Rizzolati & Si-
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nigaglia, 2008; Pätzold, 2010a). They form a structure that alows us to under-
stand somebody else’s action  by experiencing a  kind  of internal resonance 
along with what is observed outside. Vitorio Galese, one of the researchers 
who  originaly  discovered  mirror  neurons,  uses the term ‘embodied simula-
tion’ (Galese, 2005) to describe their function: ‘Our brains, and those of oth-
er primates, appear to have developed a basic functional mechanism, embo-
died simulation, which gives us an experiential insight of other minds.’ (Gal-
lese et al., 2004, p. 401) 
Miror neurons do not only exist in motor areas of the brain, however; on-
going research has discovered several other areas and types of miror neurons. 
It seems that  miror  neuron clusters are also involved in  understanding  other 
people’s emotions (cf.  Galese,  2005,  p.  37).  Furthermore, there are ‘audio-
visual  miror  neurons’ (ibid.) linking auditive and  visual experiences.  The 
whole system of miror neurons supports mutual understanding on diferent le-
vels, from observing and understanding actions to empathising with others. The 
simulative character of the miror neuron system is also described by the term 
resonance. Observing a particular action may lead to resonance within the ob-
server, and this resonance  helps the  observer  understand  what  he  or she  ob-
served. Consequently, the degree of resonance with respect to a certain obser-
vation may vary between diferent observers. The term resonance was original-
ly  used to  describe an acoustic  phenomenon.  A relatively smal amount  of 
energy can cause vibrations in an oscilatory system if the frequency of the im-
pulse is similar to the eigenfrequency of the system. For instance, a sound may 
cause a guitar string to oscilate if it is of the same pitch the string is tuned to. 
Similarly, the metaphor of tuning is used in descriptions of miror neurons. We 
may experience resonance  within  our  miror  neuron system if  we are ‘tuned’ 
accordingly Galese uses the term intentional atunement (Galese, 2005, p. 31) 
to make clear that this tuning is not a fixed bodily characteristic but something 
which can be changed and developed. 
It is quite obvious that these findings may have an impact on our ideas of 
learning and teaching.  Learning specific  movements (e.g. in  physical train-
ing) seems to depend on prior conceptual insights into the whole movement: 
therefore, it might in some cases be counterproductive to decompose move-
ments into smaler, seemingly easier  parts to facilitate learning.  Moreover, 
the concept  of intentional atunement clearly shows that learning specific 
emotional and social actions  might  be eased  by learning  more about the 
process of atunement. Eventualy, the respective processes may be harnessed 
to benefit teaching. 
The findings  on  miror  neurons  – as  wel as similar results  of recent 
neuroscience  –  promise to  give  us a significantly  deeper insight into the 
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neuronal processes that go along with learning, but they must not be confused 
with the  phenomenon itself.  From a  pedagogical  perspective, it is  not the 
brain that learns, but the person: anybody who works in the field of education 
is involved  with  persons, after al,  not  with  brains (Jarvis,  2006;  Giesinger, 
2006; Meyer-Drawe, 2008). 
6.3  Conclusions 
The term learning is  not so clear  once  we look at its  meanings in  diferent 
contexts. In addition to the various actors (people, cognitive systems, brains, 
etc.) that are regarded as learners in the discussions mentioned above, we also 
talk about learning  organisations, companies, and even immune systems. It 
seems necessary, therefore, to further clarify the concept of learning we wish 
to adhere to in pedagogical contexts. Again, the reference shal be the person, 
understood  mainly in  phenomenological terms.  Based  on this  qualification, 
the contributions of other sciences can be ordered accordingly without com-
peting with one another. 
•  Behaviourism (including both the classic concepts and more elaborated re-
cent contributions to  psychology  known as  behavioural science) captures 
learning as causing changes in behaviour. More precisely, as the research 
focus of behaviourism is on predicting those changes according to specific 
interventions, learning causes  predicable changes in  behaviour.  To study 
learning in a  behaviourist  manner therefore  means first  of al to see the 
subject as a learning system in a behaviourist sense. This is by no means a 
weakness of the theory, but it has to be kept in mind when applying beha-
viourist findings to educational situations. When doing so, one has to first 
make clear that the view of the subjects (usualy the learners) can safely be 
reduced to learning systems in the abovementioned sense. From this pers-
pective,  behaviourist learning theory  may fruitfuly explain aspects  of 
learning – particularly those aspects that can be organised according to the 
basic principles of stimulus and response – without claiming to be a gener-
al theory of learning in educational situations. 
•  Cognitivism amends the  behaviourist approach  by addressing internal 
states of the learning subject. One consequence of this change in focus is 
that cognitivism can  be applied  only to  human learning (as the  oppor-
tunities to gain reliable assertions about internal states of other beings are 
very limited). Obviously, this is  not a serious constraint with respect to 
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pedagogy. However, the cognitivist approach also caries another limita-
tion in its  understanding  of learning as first and foremost a cognitive 
process. Cognitive aspects doubtlessly play an important role in learning, 
but there are other dimensions that might be neglected this way. To begin 
with, a naïve cognitivist would most likely underestimate the importance 
of emotions. But even if emotions are taken into account, there are stil 
other relevant aspects to  be considered.  They  may  be captured  by the 
phenomenological term of the lived body (Leib in German, Colombeti & 
Thompson, 2007, p. 57). That said, cognitivism has a lot to say about the 
cognitive aspects of learning. Its insights into the development of certain 
concepts of thinking in particular are of great value. Piaget and his vast 
aray of successors have found out striking details about learning in a di-
verse range of subjects including numbers, geometry, morale, and many 
others.  Cognitivism thus  provides another  piece to the jigsaw  puzzle  of 
learning,  but like  behaviourism, it cannot claim to  be a comprehensive 
theory of learning. 
•  Constructivism in a way grew out of the combination of cognitivist think-
ing and other, particularly systemic, thoughts. It is sometimes regarded as a 
learning theory in its own right, but its original aspiration reaches further, 
questioning the very basics of the philosophy of science. Then again, con-
structivism lately has produced a variety of new contributions to teaching 
methodology, and, furthermore, has been utilised to justify and refine exist-
ing  ones.  Constructivism therefore  has already  proven to  be an inspiring 
model of learning and may very wel stimulate creative didactic thinking. 
Yet to serve as a learning theory, it stil lacks fundamental theoretical clari-
fications (e.g. concerning the actor who is actualy doing the constructing). 
In its  more  moderate, education-related  variants, constructivism  usualy 
shares the cognitive bias of cognitivism, its psychological root. In our dis-
cussions of learning and teaching, constructivism is useful for showing the 
opportunities as wel as the pitfals to be aware of when going from theory 
to practice in the field of learning and teaching. 
•  Neuroscience turns out to be a rich source of inspiration for educational 
thinking  on learning and teaching.  Not  only  do some  of its recent fin-
dings  provide empirical evidence to support existing  pedagogic convic-
tions (and  disprove some  other cherished  beliefs), its  new insights into 
the brain’s function may also guide us towards answers to open questions 
within existing theories  of  mental  processes.  Mirror  neurons, for ex-
ample, may explain the convergence of experience between different in-
dividuals,  which is stil  quite  mysterious from a radical constructivist’s 
point  of  view.  From a  pedagogic  point  of  view,  however,  we  need to 
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make clear that neuroscience is limited to those aspects of learning that 
are related more or less directly to neural processes. As with cognitivism, 
there is no doubt about the general importance of neural activity in learn-
ing, but neuroscience, with its restricted focus on this activity, positively 
cannot cover the phenomenon of learning in its entirety. 
The role that  psychological and  biological concepts  of learning  play in the 
debate  on education in  general and  on adult education in  particular cannot 
easily be underestimated. Any educational professional is expected to know 
about the fundamental  mechanisms  of cognitive  processes, and especialy 
about their implications for learning.  When  planning educational interven-
tions of any sort, he or she should be aware of what those theories might con-
tribute to the design of those plans and to the evaluation of outcomes. There-
fore, students in adult education are strongly encouraged to explore these 
psychological and biological concepts in more detail than can be provided in 
this study  guide (see e.g.  Bélanger,  2011, for an expanded  presentation  of 
psychological theories). Authors such as Jarvis (2006, pp.177f.) or Gieseke 
(2007,  pp.  49f.) extensively  discuss the respective findings in  psychology, 
neuroscience, emotional  psychology, and so forth.  On the  other  hand, the 
overview of theories presented in this chapter was also meant to ilustrate the 
limitations  of approaches towards learning that  were imported from  other 
disciplines. Although it is absolutely necessary to know and utilise them, they 
cannot replace concepts rooted in educational science to capture the  phe-
nomenon of learning from a pedagogic perspective. Johann Friedrich Herbart, 
the German philosopher and psychologist who founded pedagogy as an aca-
demic  discipline,  once claimed that  pedagogy  has to rely  on ‘native terms’ 
(Herbart, 1806/1992). Although the term learning is used in a variety of dis-
ciplines ranging from medicine to education, management, and cybernetics, it 
is reasonable, from my point of view, to treat it as a term native to education 
– that is to say, to relate it to the meanings it receives in other disciplines ra-
ther than to replace it with those other meanings. 
Exercises and tasks 
Exercise 1 
Think of a particular subject mater in adult education. Which didactic deci-
sions do you think might be particularly promising in a learning situation if 
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you wanted to account for the aleged functions of mirror neurons in your ac-
tions? 
Exercise 2 
The authors of some recent books and articles talk about the ‘learning brain’, 
or use similar phrases. Relate this usage of the term learning to the way the 
term is used in previous chapters of this study guide. 
Task 1 
Have a look at the volume by Paul Bélanger (2011) in this study guide series 
(see below). If we keep thinking of learning as a change of the person in the 
lifeworld – how does this change primarily take place, according to each of 
the three main theories described in Part 1 of Bélanger’s book? 
Bélanger, P. (2011). Theories in adult learning and education. Opladen: Bu-
drich. 
Task 2 
We frequently  mentioned the idea  of learning  as  a change  of the  person. 
Compare this concept of the person to that used in neurosciences, particularly 
with respect to the mirror neurons. 
Galese, V., Eagle, M. N. & Migone, P. (2007). Intentional attunement: Mirror 
neurons and the neural underpinnings of interpersonal relations. Journal of 
the American Psychoanalytical Association, 55(1), 132–176. 

 
Part Two 
The ‘Art of Teaching’: 
Exploring Concepts of Adult 
Learning to Address Didactic 
Chalenges 

7.  Didactics and Didactic Models 
7.1  Preliminaries on the term didactic 
The term didactic is used quite often in this study guide. But even though it is 
a common word in many European languages, its meanings vary significant-
ly.  Moreover, even  within  one single language, the term  may  not always 
mean exactly the same. In this  book, didactic  wil  be  used to  describe the 
thoughts and actions of people professionaly involved in the field of educa-
tion. This covers teaching, training, and facilitating, as wel as planning and 
evaluation. Since this is not a universaly accepted definition, it shal be justi-
fied (and specified further) with the help of some brief historical and termino-
logical remarks. 
The  origin  of the term didactic (from  Greek didaktikos, from didaskein 
‘teach’)  may  be traced to John  Amos  Comenius’s Didactica  Magna.  Ori-
ginaly published in Latin in 1657, it is considered to be the first major book 
on pedagogy generaly. Comenius used the term didactic to provide a general 
method  or,  more  precisely, a  pathway to  overcome the shortcomings  of al 
prior atempts of schooling and teaching. Right in the first chapter, he formu-
lated his ambitious claim: 
We venture to promise a GREAT DIDACTIC, that is to say, the whole art of teaching al 
things to al men, and indeed of teaching them with certainty, so that the result cannot fail 
to folow. (Comenius, 1657/1967, p. 5) 
With this statement,  Comenius  probably  prepared the  ground  both for the 
term’s successful career and for the continuous  debate about it.  On the  one 
hand, he stated that didactics was the right term to address the efort of teach-
ing  professionaly  and  appropriately,  which in fact  means that teaching 
should first and foremost serve the  wel-being of the individual. (Comenius 
assumed that educators  would  be  guided  by a  wel-understood  Christian 
world view.) On the other hand, he also stated that there could be some infal-
lible pathway towards such an education, thus promising there could be some 
kind  of educational technology that  would  work independently  of the indi-
viduality  of the learner  or  other situational conditions.  As  Comenius  based 
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his thoughts deeply in religious convictions, he may have had greater faith in 
the general similarities in human nature. Today, the notion of a supraindivi-
dual kind of education that would work for just anybody sounds a bit strange 
to us. 
The term didactics, however, has been adopted widely since Comenius’s 
days,  but its increasing  popularity came at the cost  of it  being expanded to 
cover a  variety  of  diferent ideas,  which  may stil  be roughly categorised, 
however, as  having an  orientation towards technology  on the  one  hand,  or 
towards the  wel-being and  development  of the individual  on the  other. 
Against the background of contemporary achievements in learning theory, it 
is quite obvious that the traditional concept fails to address the complexity of 
the individual’s learning processes. Yet this particular point of view is closely 
linked to the English usage of didactics. 
The term ‘didactics’ has come to have a negative meaning in Anglo-American educational 
research and practice. Hamilton .. argues that this reflects definitions such as those given 
in the Oxford English Dictionary, that equate the term with ‘formalist educational practices 
that combine “dogma” with “dulness”’. (Unwin, 2008, p. 509) 
This,  however,  has  not always  been the case.  When John  Dewey  described 
the term in the Cyclopedia of Education a hundred years ago, he stil had a 
rather  positive  view  of it (cf.  Dewey,  1911; see also  Friesen,  2007), even 
though the idea of using one single method stil was apparent. In his short ar-
ticle, Dewey directly refered to the German tradition, in which didactics was 
an independent ‘division of the many fields into which pedagogy in general is 
subdivided’ (ibid.).  Today,  our  understanding  of  didactics as the ‘art and 
science of teaching’ (ibid.), which aims at the individual’s development and 
growth, is not restricted to the German use of the term but is also reflected in 
its use in other countries, including Scandinavia and many Eastern European 
countries. The French use of didactics, namely in the predominant concept of 
the situation  didactique (Brousseau,  1998), also leads away from teacher-
driven designs. Here, knowledge is considered to be 
encapsulated in situations, and it is in  going through those situations that the  pupil,  or 
whoever, can learn. This view of learning as ‘learning form the situation’ (much more than 
from the teacher, which is the institution’s orthodox view of it) remains central to French 
didactics. (Chevalard, 2007, p. 132) 
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Keyword: Didactics 
 
Folowing this ‘continental’ interpretation of the term, didactics in its 
different forms, can be described as systematic reflection about how to 
organise teaching in a way that brings about the individual growth of 
the student. This means that subject matters can open up different 
educative meanings for learners; and thus that teaching and learning 
folow different paths. (Hudson & Schneuwly, 2007, pp. 106–107) 
 
To clarify which view on didactics they are refering to, some authors distin-
guish between the English didactics and the German Didaktik. Although this 
helps clarify the reference, it somehow obscures the Latin and Czech origins 
of the concept, its reception  by  people such as  Dewey, and its  meaning in 
other  European areas.  So even though  we should remain  wel aware  of the 
fact that didactics is sometimes understood in a rather limited way as a tech-
nology of learning, the wider meaning of the term shal serve as the basis for 
the discussions in this study guide. 
However, to  deal  with the  diverse  meanings  of  didactics appropriately, 
we do have to introduce a German term, namely Bildung. The idea is of Bil-
dung is closely related to the  neo-humanist  philosophy represented  by  Wil-
helm  von Humboldt (see also  Chapters 3.2, 5.2). Although several volumes 
could be filed with contributions to a theory of Bildung, there are a few as-
pects that are  particularly relevant for  our further considerations  here. Bil-
dung is sometimes legitimately regarded as a somewhat blured term. It is not 
easy to find an appropriate  English translation (formation, education, and 
erudition are common candidates),  but then again, the same is true  of other 
philosophical terms that  have  been  discussed  mainly in  one  particular lan-
guage area. Consequently, we folow the example of other authors and leave 
the word untranslated. Bildung, then, can be regarded as ‘a state of being that 
can  be characterised  by a cluster  of atributes  described  by terms such as 
“educated”, “knowledgeable”, “learned”, “literary”, “philosophical”, “scho-
larly”, and “wise”’ (Hudson, 2007, p. 136). 
Hudson  describes the results  of Bildung, and  of course there are  many 
other aspects to consider. Yet his description captures the idea of Bildung as a 
state  of  being rather than as a  material  possession.  Furthermore, it is  not a 
state  of  being that is reached at a certain age and then continues in a self-
sustaining fashion; rather, it should  be thought  of as the result  of  ongoing 
strife. Like musical virtuosity or great athletic performance, Bildung is both: 
the result and the way to get there. For didactic considerations, this is of tre-
mendous importance. Relating didactic action to Bildung the way it is done in 
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the German discussion and elsewhere (cf. Biesta, 2009) means that learning 
outcomes are not to be evaluated by their usefulness for a particular domain 
of  work  or  other  practice,  but always  within a  greater scheme  of  desirable 
outcomes of educational efort. The exact nature of these outcomes is a mat-
ter of the ongoing discussion on the theory of Bildung, but it is clear that any 
claim  of supporting Bildung  means supporting individual learners  not  only 
according to externaly prescribed learning goals but also according to their 
individual needs as persons in the world. 
7.2  Didactic models and models of instruction 
No  mater  which term is  used to  describe formal teaching activity and the 
coresponding theoretical considerations, the area is obviously too promising 
not to invite the creation of certain concepts and models of teaching. Depend-
ing  on their  origin and focus, they  may  be caled  didactic  models,  designs, 
methodological concepts, or phase schemata. They al claim to provide a sys-
tematic and  wel-structured schema  of actions and events that can  be fol-
lowed to achieve a specific learning result with a group of learners. Idealy, 
they are also supported  by empirical evidence  with respect to  outcomes, as 
compared to  other  methodological approaches.  Unfortunately, the later re-
quirement is the subject of constant debates about whether it is actualy poss-
ible to evaluate the results  of something as complex as a  group  of learners 
without accepting tremendous shortcomings in the validity  of the results. 
This study guide is not the place to go into the details of this discussion, but 
we do have to make a few assumptions regarding this issue. 
Obviously, learning research can be conducted in a way that delivers sig-
nificant results concerning the relationship between a particular treatment (‘me-
thod’) and the results. The more researchers are able to keep those factors con-
stant that are not in focus, the more precise their research wil be. Accordingly, 
it is  quite  dificult to  measure, let’s say, the  outcomes  of two  diferent treat-
ments within a four-year programme in cultural studies. During the time of the 
course, students wil be exposed to such a vast variety of influences that it wil 
hardly  be  possible to  determine  which results can safely  be atributed to the 
treatment. In principle, this objection holds for any learning research. Yet there 
are  methodological as  wel as theoretical  precautions that can  be taken to re-
duce those risks.  However, it seems impossible to  obtain immediate results 
about the relationship between a treatment and its learning outcomes as long as 
there is no way of realising a laboratory-like research situation. If it is absolute-
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ly necessary to produce such results, they are likely to be produced by violating 
at least some  of the  methodological standards  of  quantitative research.  Re-
searchers and stakeholders who are forced to be accountable in such cases may 
find it dificult to act responsibly (cf. Pätzold, 2010c). 
Empirical evidence for certain complex treatments (e.g. paterns of teach-
ing methods) therefore often stems from research that covers only one part of 
the whole process. For example, researchers may measure learning outcomes in 
terms  of  what  was remembered: they may focus  only  on a  particular  phase 
within the whole process, or they may incorporate research results from a dif-
ferent field that is regarded as analogous. Although this practice is both legiti-
mate and necessary for investigating learning and teaching, it may contain pit-
fals. The research could fail to record unexpected secondary efects, or the me-
thod  of transfering findings from  one field to another  may  be improper  or 
flawed. Al of these objections are not meant to question the relevance of em-
pirical learning research in general, but to point out that any didactic approach 
is  highly  unlikely to  generaly  prove superior to  others.  Rather, there  wil  be 
evidence for the appropriateness  of a certain treatment  out  of theoretical con-
siderations (which themselves may indeed be tested empiricaly). For these rea-
sons, concrete didactic models play a minor role in this study guide. Instead of 
giving an overview of the various models and the ways in which they are prac-
tised, criticised, and  discussed, this chapter shal introduce three selected ap-
proaches as examples of didactic models. By that, it shal not be disputed that 
these  models  may  be  useful and important in  both theory and  practice.  How-
ever, the models themselves cannot be regarded as ‘learning theories’. 
The first group of models is concerned with the temporal and systematic 
sequence of learning. In fact, one such model, Kolb’s learning cycle, has al-
ready  been  mentioned (see  Chapter  5).  The idea  of such phase schemata 
reaches  back at least to the  nineteenth century; in rudimentary form,  phase 
schemata can  be found in almost any formal teaching activity.  A common 
and very basic example would be initiating the learning process by exposing 
learners to new content, then giving them the opportunity to experiment with 
it, then summarising important findings, and finaly devoting time to practice. 
 
Keyword: Phase schema 
 
A phase schema provides a structured series of steps expected to occur 
during a learning process. It is used either as a model of learning (iden-
tifying the different steps of a more or less general sequence, that can 
be applied to various kinds of learning) or as a planning aid for teach-
ing (suggesting certain steps regarded as useful to support learning). 
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Basicaly, phase schemata assume that learning takes place according to a se-
quence  of  distinct steps;  hence teaching should  provide the respective im-
pulses and opportunities. If, for example, learning is regarded as the result of 
some experience of cognitive iritation that makes the learner look for infor-
mation to resolve it, teaching could  be  organised  by creating iritating ex-
periences and then  giving students  hints  on  how to straighten things  out 
again. It is generaly accepted that, from a systematic point of view, such se-
quences do in fact exist (e.g. Piaget’s process of equilibration), but it is difi-
cult, if not impossible, to apply these to a general scheme. How much irita-
tion is appropriate? When is the right time to provide hints to solve the issue? 
Which sequence  of solutions is right if there are  multiple reasons for irita-
tion?  Phase schemata  have  been  discussed extensively in  German  didactics 
(cf. Jank & Meyer, 2009). They ofer useful and sound suggestions for tem-
poral and systematic structure as long as they are regarded as proposals rather 
than rigid and  general templates for planning and conducting teaching.  Be-
sides, phase schemata are to be found in other approaches such as the folow-
ing, known as cognitive apprenticeship. 
Basicaly, this concept  picks  up ideas and structures from traditional 
craftsman apprenticeship training and transfers them to  predominantly cog-
nitive areas. Colins, Brown, and Newman (1989) introduced the term cogni-
tive  apprenticeship and applied it to  domains such as  writing and  mathe-
matics. The authors begin their argument by citing tradition, explaining that 
throughout history 
apprenticeship  was the  most common  means  of learning and  was  used to transmit the 
knowledge required for expert  practice in fields from  painting and sculpting to  medicine 
and law. Even today, many complex and important skils, such as those required for lan-
guage  use and social interaction, are learned informaly through apprenticeship-like  me-
thods  – that is,  methods  not involving  didactic teaching,  but  observation, coaching, and 
successive approximation. (Colins et al., 1989, p. 1) 
This quotation describes an approach to teaching that is surprisingly similar 
to that  of  Comenius. (And  by the  way, it also  provides a  good example  of 
how the term didactic is used in a negative sense.). Like Colins et al., Com-
enius claimed that  using teaching  methods  would  help reduce the efort re-
quired by the teacher, and he devoted part of his studies to easing the learning 
of foreign languages (Comenius,  1657/1967,  pp.  203ff.;  Keatinge,  1967,  p. 
5).  Ultimately,  both approaches claim to  promote a  most ‘natural’  way  of 
learning (cf.  Colins et al.,  1987,  p.  28;  Comenius,  1657/1967, e.g.  pp. 
127ff.). 
According to cognitive apprenticeship, a teaching-learning sequence 
consists  of six steps,  which are  usualy caled  modeling, coaching, scaf-
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folding (and fading), articulation, reflection, and finaly, exploration (cf. Col-
lins et al., 1989, pp. 16f.). The sequence very much resembles that proposed 
by other phase models, but puts an emphasis on phases in which the learners 
are active. Scafolding, for instance,  means that students explore the appli-
cability of newly acquired skils without having to completely master them in 
advance. The teacher, in this phase, merely provides some form of ‘scafold-
ing’ (ibid, p. 2) and step by step ‘reduces his participation (fades), providing 
only limited hints, refinements, and feedback to the learner’ (ibid., p. 3). The 
approach includes a  number  of further ideas, some  of  which are related to 
learning theory rather than to the aprenticeship model. For example, it em-
phasises that articulating  one’s  knowledge is crucial for consolidating and 
developing it. The model of cognitive apprenticeship refers to the more gen-
eral approach of situated learning (cf. Lave & Wenger, 1991), which original-
ly referred to the observation of apprenticeship training in Western Africa (cf. 
Lave, 1977). In summary, cognitive apprenticeship stands for an eclectic ap-
proach based on history, contemporary observations of work life, and learn-
ing theory. Furthermore, it underscores the findings from reviews of existing 
empirical studies  on learning and teaching,  which are  presented as ‘success 
models for cognitive apprenticeship’ (Colins et al., 1987, p. 5). The idea of 
cognitive apprenticeship has been quite influential, although this may partly 
be  due to the fact that, to a certain extent, it relies  on observations of good 
practice and its  underlying concepts (a fact the authors  do  not  deny).  As a 
consequence, the concept as a  whole today is  more  often  discussed in text-
books on teaching than it is used in practice, where it rather serves as a col-
lection of ideas for conducting lessons. 
If cognitive apprenticeship stands for situational and eclectic concepts, the 
folowing approach by the German scholar Wolfgang Klafki stands for the at-
tempt to create a didactic model that is al of one piece. The result has become 
known as critical-constructive  didactics.  Klafki’s  goal, from the  beginning, 
was to link teachers’ need to prepare for their lessons with a concept that was 
wel founded in theory, rather independent  of educational ‘fashions’, and stil 
inspiring enough to foster creative  didactic thought.  He found the appropriate 
reference in Bildung (see above). As Bildung was regarded as the overal goal 
of al educational eforts,  Klafki  needed to clarify  which learning  maters ac-
tualy contributed to it.  To  determine the  value any such  mater  holds for 
achieving Bildung, Klafki formulated the folowing five basic questions: 
•  What is the mater’s importance for the learner’s presence? 
•  Equaly, what is its importance for the learner’s future? 
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•  What does the mater stand for – that is, what does it exemplify with re-
gard to which overal context? 
•  How can the learner actualy access the  mater  – that is,  what  kind  of 
prior knowledge and experience help facilitate learners’ access to a new 
learning mater? 
•  How can learners show whether they were actualy successful in learning 
the mater? 
Klafki  devoted  much atention to the critical evaluation and justification  of 
those questions on a philosophical basis. Thus his focus lay on the learning 
mater and the procedures for choosing it appropriately. Initialy, Klafki was 
criticised for  being  not  quite so careful in  discussing the actual  methods, 
however. After incorporating these critical comments in the further evolution 
of his model, Klafki eventualy introduced the preliminary perspective chart 
(Figure 11). Here, the methodological structure has been included to take ac-
count of the fact that teaching methods and the learning mater are anything 
but independent of one another. 
 
Figure 11: Klafki’s preliminary perspective chart 
 
Source: Klafki, 1985, p. 215 
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Whereas the phase schema can be used to structure concrete lessons in a tem-
poral and sequential  way, the  perspective chart  provides a  more systematic 
view  of the issues to  be considered  when  planning a lesson. It is  wel in-
formed  by theory,  with the  philosophy  of education and Bildung  playing a 
predominant role,  but it can certainly  not  be caled  very  practical. If  phase 
schemata  or cognitive apprenticeship are regarded as  planning tools, then 
critical-constructive didactics is more of a means for reflection and justifica-
tion.  Stil, al three  perspectives contribute to the  whole  picture, as, for in-
stance, critical-constructive didactics may more thoroughly inform our reflec-
tions on the person as a learner – a good deal of what belongs to a person is 
reflected in issues such as present meaning. 
With this example, we shal conclude our overview of didactic models. 
As pointed out above, this study guide is not designed to provide concrete 
planning tools. Such tools are related to theories of education (and, some-
times, learning),  but  usualy they are  not theories in and  of themselves. 
However, didactic models are sometimes considered indispensable as prac-
tical approaches for  planning and reflecting  on teaching activities.  With 
that in mind, and with the help of some additional examples, we would like 
to encourage you to design your own didactic model, one firmly rooted in 
both theory and experience.  To support  you, the folowing sections shal 
elaborate  on the aspects  of learning that  have already  been carved  out  by 
our theoretical considerations in Part One, and link them to didactic conclu-
sions. 
Exercises and tasks 
Exercise 1 
Didactic models may serve as planning aids, but as rigid schemes of learning, 
they could also  discourage creativity.  Discuss the  opportunities and risks 
provided by such models with respect to diferent situations in adult learning 
and teaching. 
Exercise 2 
Apply Klafki’s perspective scheme to some teaching you have experienced. 
Where  does it fit,  where  does it  not fit?  Can  you think  of stages in the 
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teaching that could have been improved by considering Klafki’s systematic 
ideas? 
Task 1 
Read an  English-language  document in  which the  German term Bildung is 
used as a loan word (e.g. Biesta, 2009, see below) and discuss whether refer-
ring to the German term is essential for the author’s argument. 
Biesta, G. (2009). Educational research, democracy and TLRP. Lecture presen-
ted at the TLRP event Methodological Development, Future Chalenges, Lon-
don, United Kingdom. Available at 
http:/www.tlrp.org/dspace/handle/123456789/1620 
Task 2 
Read the ‘Greeting to the reader’ in  Comenius’s Didactica  Magna.  How 
would you translate this centuries-old mission of education to contemporary 
adult education? Which parts of it may be realistic, which parts may be uto-
pian? 
Comenius, J. A. (1657/1967). Great didactic (M. W. Keatinge, Trans.). New 
York: Russel & Russel. 
 
8.  Reflections on Learning 
8.1  Learning and non-learning 
Professionals in any field work to produce, maintain, or restore a certain state 
of affairs with respect to people, including the distribution of power or goods, 
personal situations, or the like. Lawyers and judges, for example, work to cla-
rify legal relationships and administer justice;  doctors strive to  maintain  or 
restore their  patients’  health; and librarians aim to  provide customers  with 
reading suggestions that match their interests. In each of these cases, there are 
basicaly two possibilities: either the professionals succeed in their effort or 
they fail. Obviously the same holds for members of the teaching profession: 
either they succeed in supporting learners with respect to learning impact, test 
results, and so forth, or they fail in the sense that learners do not achieve the 
desired learning  outcomes.  Yet their situation is a  bit  diferent from that in 
many  other  professions.  As  our  discussion  on learning  up to  his  point  has 
clearly shown, an individual learner’s contribution to the learning  process 
and its results is  hardly to  be  overestimated.  While there is  no  doubt that 
teachers and trainers can do a lot to facilitate learning, it is equaly obvious 
that they are not at al capable of forcing somebody to learn once that person 
has, deliberately or not, decided not to learn. In contrast to what is often said, 
we cannot make somebody learn. Al the teaching professional can do in that 
case is to create conditions to support the learning efort of the individual as 
much as possible. In some cases, this may even mean that the learner doesn’t 
fuly realise that he or she is actualy learning. (Some types of ‘edutainment’ 
programmes  obviously try to folow this  path.)  And  yet, learning  outcomes 
strictly  depend  on what  happens on the learners’ side.  Learners’ lived body 
and mind and their relationship to their material and social surroundings are 
crucial factors that can  only  be influenced  or  moderated  by  what a teacher, 
trainer, or facilitator does. 
The term prosumer (originaly coined by Alvin Toffler) is often used to 
describe a general shift in the production structures of Western societies, one 
in  which the role  of the consumer and that  of the  producer are  partialy 
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merged.  Originaly, it  was related to a  variety  of societal  developments in-
cluding the emergence  of the  do-it-yourself-sector, self-help in  health care, 
and the  use  of  media,  but it can  be applied to education as  wel (Arnold  & 
Pätzold,  2008,  p.  103).  Learners  may consume a certain service, such as a 
course  or a lecture, to acquire a certain  kind  of skil,  knowledge,  or expe-
rience. Yet at the same time, they are producing these outcomes themselves, 
because the  processing  of  what they  undergo is  bound to their  own  mental 
and bodily processes. Not only the satisfaction they may gain out of the expe-
rience  but also the learning results themselves are learners’  own  products. 
More than three  decades ago,  Knowles  made a strong  point in  his  work  on 
andragogy when he said that even though learners tended to rely on the sup-
port  of teachers, experts, and advisers, as  wel as  on  media and tools, they 
stil should be regarded as self-directed (cf. Knowles, 1975, p. 18). In other 
words, the learning results should be atributed to learners’ own eforts. Or, 
as Jarvis put it, ‘it is the person who learns’ (Jarvis, 2006, p. 32). 
We may stil object that the situation is quite similar in the other profes-
sions  mentioned above.  A  doctor, for example,  may  put a  broken leg in 
splints, but it is the patient who, through his or her bodily functions, eventual-
ly helps close the fracture. Likewise, a librarian may suggest a most fascinat-
ing book or author, and yet the client might be displeased, possibly because 
of a bad mood or other circumstances that have nothing to do with the libra-
rian’s suggestion. These examples show that there are in fact a lot of situa-
tions in which a patient or customer may influence the actual use of a service, 
but the diference to learning is that there is absolutely no way to get around 
the learner’s internal processes. A doctor may trust in the ability of bones to 
restore broken substance, but he may also use a prosthesis. An exciting book 
may fail to captivate a librarian’s client,  but  on second thoughts,  he  or she 
would  have to admit that it  was  unfavourable circumstances rather than a 
poor recommendation that kept him or her from enjoying the book. 
Learning theory often underestimates or even completely ignores the in-
terelations between learner, teacher/trainer, and other learners, perhaps part-
ly  because  of the complex  nature  of the relationship  between  provision and 
outcomes. Those branches of learning theory that define learning as a special 
type of mental process, therefore, have a particular tendency to deal only with 
the  question  of  how learning  occurs,  whereas the  question  of  what  happens 
exactly when learning does not occur is often neglected. In recent literature, 
this issue  has  been addressed  more frequently,  however.  For educational 
thinking, non-learning  obviously is a serious issue.  At the social level, it is 
addressed in terms of participation (at least as far as formal learning is con-
cerned),  whereas at the individual level, it  may  be considered as resulting 
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from inappropriate teaching that  doesn’t  match the  needs  of the learner. 
Moreover,  non-learning  may  be related to the learner’s  physical condition 
(e.g. being tired, exhausted, etc.). But ultimately, it must also be considered 
as something emerging from the internal logic of the learner and therefore as 
something systematicaly hidden from complete outside observation. 
In recent discussions, non-learning has not only begun to be regarded as 
a phenomenon worthy of investigation within learning research, but has also 
lost  much  of its  one-sided,  negative connotation. Jarvis, for example, in-
cluded non-learning in his learning cycle as one of several possible results. 
 
Keyword: Non-learning 
 
A learner may go through a learning experience and come away as a 
changed person, but he or she may also emerge from the same expe-
rience more or less unchanged, as depicted in Jarvis’ model of the 
learning cycle (see Figure 6). 
 
Only if  we  define learning exclusively as a transformation  of the  person is 
non-learning an  option not to  be considered.  But this stresses the  point that 
learning results  may  difer considerably from teachers’ intentions. In such 
cases, learners may have deliberately refused to comply with a certain learn-
ing task, but at the same time they may have learned something else (cf. Jar-
vis, 2009, p. 83). If we remember the perspective of Dewey, who saw lear-
ning as a fundamental developmental process within a democratic society, it 
becomes obvious that this type of learning is not just a possible secondary ef-
fect, but crucial for innovation. Refusing to learn what is taught oficialy and 
thereby learning something  different  has  often turned  out to  be a  driving 
force behind societal change. In this case, non-learning is the visible expres-
sion of learning resistance. To regard this occurence of non-learning as defi-
cient,  or to assume that nothing at al  has  been learned,  would  be short-
sighted (see also Faulstich & Grel, 2004). 
At  present, a single comprehensive theory  of learning and  non-learning 
does not exist. Although some authors (most notably Jarvis, Faulstich, Grel, 
and Ileris) address the issue  of  non-learning, their emphasis is stil  on the 
opposite  process.  Theories such as transformative learning  do  not  deny the 
possibility of non-learning, but they put their focus diferently. Scholars such 
as Klaus Holzkamp, a German psychologist who had a major influence on Il-
leris, on the other hand, tried to explain how and why non-learning may not 
only be a secondary efect but even the main result of certain kinds and cir-
cumstances of teaching (Holzkamp, 1995). For the folowing chapters on di-
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dactic issues, therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge that non-learning may 
occur at diferent levels, and that it  does not  necessarily indicate that either 
the facilitator or the learner have failed in their respective eforts. With that in 
mind,  we  may, as a starting  point, look at  one  of  your  own learning expe-
riences in the folowing exercise. 
8.2  Exercise: Reflection on learning 
This exercise is meant to present a number of practical results of our discus-
sions of learning research up to this point. At the same time, it provides an 
opportunity for you to reflect upon your own learning by exploring a single 
learning process. The idea is to actualise your experience as a learner to form 
a basis for our discussion of the facilitator’s perspective in the folowing sec-
tions. Below is a questionnaire I recently used in the context of learning re-
search (cf.  Pätzold,  2008).  My aim  was to apply findings from  different 
learning theories to the self-reported learning experiences of adults. Although 
the focus is  on learning in  general, the  questionnaire  has also  been  used to 
diferentiate learning processes according to diferent ages in order to identi-
fy the respective differences. 
Like the  participants in  my research,  you are  now asked to fil in the 
questionnaire.  Please select  one  of the learning tasks  provided (or choose 
your own) and answer al the questions with respect to this particular learn-
ing process. For most of the questions, there are two scales: the first scale has 
five levels and asks for your level of agreement with the respective item; the 
second scale has only three levels and asks for your level of certainty regard-
ing your answer. Most questions also provide an opportunity for taking notes. 
Completing the questionnaire may take about 20 minutes. 
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Figure 12: Questionnaire on an individual learning process 
1a) Please select one item out of the folowing list of learning issues. Al your an-
swers in the folowing should refer to this item. If none of the suggestions appeals 
to you, please name one of your own and note it in the field ‘other’. 
1  Fractional  arithmetic  
2  Classical  music  
3  Lacing  shoes  
4 Interest in politics/political awareness 
5  Bicycling  
6  Swimming  
7  Logical  thinking  
8  Systems  theory/constructivism  
9  Sports (which one?)  
10  Parlour game (which one?)   
11 Other  
 
 
1b) Please outline your learning issue. Did it concern basic knowledge or compre-
hensive ability; was it embedded in a broader learning project; etc.? 
 
 
 
2) Please indicate when your learning process took place (please enter a year, a 
date, a school class, or something similar) 
From To About this answer I am 
  sure O partly sure O  unsure O 
 
Notes 
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3) Please rate the importance of other people during your learning process: 
 Agreement  
(from 
++: fuly agree to 
--: fuly disagree) 
About this an-
swer I am sure 
(+), partly sure 
(o), unsure (-) 
 ++  +  o  -  -  +   o  -  
Others were important as teachers.         
Others were important as partners in learning.         
Others were important because they were (inde-
pendently) learning the same. 
        
 
Notes 
 
 
4) Learning doesn’t only happen inside your head. Which role did your body play in 
your learning process? 
 Agreement sure (+) / 
unsure (-) 
 ++  +  o  -  -  +  o  -  
My body was important because the learning issue 
was a physical one. 
        
My body was important because the learning situ-
ation required physical efforts. 
        
There were physical requirements for entering the 
learning process. 
        
There were physical peculiarities (e.g. diseases) 
that influenced the learning process. 
        
The fact that my body changed during the learn-
ing process had an impact on my learning. 
        
 
Notes 
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5) Aesthetics (beauty, taste, etc.) often play a role in learning. Please indicate the 
extent to which this was true in your case. 
 Agreement  sure  (+)/  
unsure (-) 
 ++  +  o  -  -  +  o  -  
The learning issue itself had a certain aesthetic 
quality (beautiful, ugly, etc.). 
        
At least some of the learning media (books, board 
drawings) were excelently designed. 
        
In dealing with the learning issue, I acted in an 
aesthetic way (drawing pictures, moving, etc.). 
        
Learning the issue enabled me to do something 
else in an aesthetic way (e.g. using math to create 
graphs). 
        
 
Notes 
 
 
6) Did you learn the issue at least partly in a way that was different from school or 
similar modes: 
 Agreement sure (+) / 
unsure (-) 
 ++  +  o  -  -  +  o  -  
Learning mostly was embedded in my daily rou-
tines (work, hobbies, etc.). 
        
Learning mostly took place unconsciously.         
The individual learning occasions usualy hap-
pened by coincidence. 
        
Learning mostly took place outside of a particular 
learning institution (school, adult education cen-
tres, etc.). 
        
I received considerable support from a teacher.         
 
Notes 
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7) The folowing questions again address details of the learning process. 
 Agreement sure (+) / 
unsure (-) 
 ++  +  o  -  -  +  o  -  
Experience  was  important  for  the  learning  process.          
Routine was important for the learning process.         
I remember a lot of experiences I had during the 
learning process. 
        
During the learning process, I made a lot of mis-
takes. 
        
Making mistakes belongs to this learning process.         
In case I made mistakes during the learning process, 
it did not have serious negative consequences. 
        
Due to the learning process, I forgot other things.         
Due to the learning process, other things I knew or 
could do before lost their validity. 
        
Acquiring knowledge played an important role 
during the learning process. 
        
Acquiring skils played an important role during 
the learning process. 
        
 
Notes 
 
 
8) The folowing questions address further conditions of the learning process. 
 Agreement  sure  (+)/  
unsure (-) 
 ++  +  o  -  -  +  o  -  
I dealt with the learning issue on a voluntary basis.         
yIn dealing with the issue, I continued learning in 
an area in which I learned before (but was inter-
rupted). 
        
The fact that I dealt with this learning issue at pre-
cisely this moment was coincidental. 
        
In retrospect, the learning process has benefitted 
my occupational development. 
        
In retrospect, the learning process has benefitted 
my personal development. 
        
At the beginning of the learning process, the issue 
was highly important to me (‘presence impor-
tance’). 
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At the beginning of the learning process, I ex-
pected the issue to become important to me in the 
future (‘future importance’). 
        
At present, it is quite useful for me to have gone 
through the learning process. 
        
At the beginning of the learning process, I was 
about.. 
  ..years old.    
 
Notes 
 
 
11) Finaly, a few questions regarding your personal impressions of the learning 
process. 
 Agreement  sure  (+)/  
unsure (-) 
 ++  +  o  -  -  +  o  -  
The learning process affected me emotionaly.         
The skils I acquired in the learning process have 
changed me as a person. 
        
The knowledge I acquired in the learning process 
has changed me as a person. 
        
Due to the learning process, my relationship to 
others has changed. 
        
Due to the learning process, my outlook on the 
world has changed. 
        
Overal, I experienced the learning process as diffi-
cult. 
        
Back then, I was very motivated to engage in the 
learning process. 
        
Back then, I was interested in the learning issue.         
I would have missed out on a lot if I hadn’t dealt 
with the learning issue. 
        
 
Notes 
Source: own source 
As  mentioned above, the questionnaire  originaly served as a research in-
strument. It  was completed  by about  200  people  of  different ages,  who re-
fered to a wide variety of learning isues. After completing the questionnaire 
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yourself,  you  may  be interested in some  of the results.  First  of al, the an-
swers proved that the general ideas of a pedagogical learning theory, as dis-
cussed in this text, can in principle be covered by questionnaires like the one 
above. The aspects of time, person, and lifeworld (mentioned in the introduc-
tion and in Chapter 5.1) could, to a certain extent, be represented in the ques-
tionnaire, and it has been shown that there is a corresponding variety of sig-
nificantly  different ratings  of the  various items and item clusters.  With re-
spect to the  person as a learner, for example, it could  be shown  via factor 
analysis that aspects  of  motivation  on the  one  hand and  of emotion  on the 
other could  quite  precisely  be  distinguished from  other  person-related  va-
riables. With respect to age, it could be shown for a variety of variables that, 
sometimes contrary to my theoretical assumptions, outcomes did in fact not 
vary significantly between diferent age groups. 
To examine the impact  of age, the  data  were  divided into two  groups: 
one group reporting learning  processes that took  place before the age  of  18 
and  one reporting  more recent  processes. It turned  out that the results  were 
the same in both groups regarding, for example, the body as a mater of learn-
ing, the extent to  which the learning  process contributed to  personal  devel-
opment, and the importance of the learning mater. Significant differences, in 
contrast, emerged  with respect to learning circumstances.  As expected, the 
learning of adults was more often reported as voluntarily and as building on 
some prior learning. These findings changed partialy when the dividing age 
was lowered from  18 to  nine  years.  At this age,  physical  development is at 
the foreground of our experience, and so are the respective (learning) activi-
ties.  Diferences therefore  were  more pronounced  here,  but  mainly  with re-
gard to physical aspects that were much more in focus as learning maters in 
this group than in the learning processes taking place after the age of nine. In 
summary, the comparison of adult and younger learners has shown that gen-
eral  variables  of a learning  process  – that is, those related to learning as a 
change of the person in the world – do not differ between adult learners and 
adolescents and children, if the age of 18 is used to separate the two groups. 
Differences in the learning processes of younger and older learners may oc-
cur if there are (age-related) differences concerning the learning mater and if 
those (age-related)  differences in turn influence the  diferences in  question. 
This is particularly true of learning in which the body is important as a learn-
ing mater, as these types of learning processes are much more frequently ex-
perienced by children than by adults. 
Now let’s return to the issue of teaching. The goal of the above exercise 
was to raise our awareness of the various aspects of the learning process as 
discussed in previous chapters: time or change, person, and lifeworld. In the 
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folowing chapters, we are going to address these aspects mainly from a di-
dactic perspective. While doing so, we have to keep in mind that they origi-
naly stem from theories about learning.  When, for example, the  phenome-
nographers (see Chapter 3.1) state that learning becomes evident in a changed 
relationship between the person and the object, they do not necessarily claim 
that teaching or facilitating has to aim at producing this change directly. One 
way of teaching could be to ask the learner to express his or her view of an 
object and then to construct a case in which this view may turn out useless. 
Another  way could  be to  provide a  more elaborate  view and leave it to the 
learner to compare the two.  A third  way could  be to  deal  with the  various 
views within a group, either theoreticaly or empiricaly through experiments. 
Al  of these  ways  may  be appropriate,  but  neither  of them  directly aims at 
triggering a particular change in a certain direction. So again we have to re-
cal the facilitative nature of teaching and the fact that teaching, due to the in-
escapable internal logic of the individual, can only be an atempt. A review of 
the learning process you dealt with in the questionnaire might underpin those 
issues, especialy if you recal the role of others in your learning. With that in 
mind, we shal now, in the folowing chapters, explore the three cornerstones 
time, person, and lifeworld from a didactical point of view. 
Exercises and tasks 
Exercise 1 
Compare  your  questionnaire results  with those  of  other students.  Are there 
unexpected diferences or general tendencies? 
Task 1 
In my research, I related some of the results from the questionnaire to partici-
pants’ educational  biographies (see  Pätzold,  2011).  Which links  do  you see 
between your results and your own previous educational experience and prac-
tice? Compare your conclusions to those reported in the article. 
Pätzold, H. (2011). Emotions, the person and the ‘lived body’: Learning expe-
riences and impacts from the ‘pedagogical orientation’. ROSE: Research on 
Steiner Education, 2(1). Available at www.rosejourn.com 

9.  Time, Person, Lifeworld: Cornerstones of Didactic 
Theory 
9.1  Time: Sequences and gestalt of learning 
Learning requires time. If  you completed the  questionnaire in the  previous 
chapter, you also indicated the time it took you to master the learning issue 
(Question 2). It may have been a very short period of time (e.g. to learn the 
basics  of a  game),  or it  may  have taken  years (e.g. to  master a  musical in-
strument). In  both cases, a few  or  many  other activities  usualy took  place 
simultaneously.  Learning a  musical instrument  does  not fuly  occupy  one’s 
time, and learning to play a parlour game, which usualy serves entertainment 
purposes, typicaly involves a lot  of chit-chat and fun.  Yet even learning a 
single  name  or a  phone  number requires a certain amount  of time  during 
which we are unable to pay ful atention to other things. There is no doubt 
that cognitive  processes, even though they sometimes seem to  happen  very 
quickly,  do  need time.  Nervous impulses  have to  go through  neurons,  be 
passed on from one to another, and be processed in various ways. 
Any cognitive effort may serve as an example. Picture your own face in 
your  mind, for example, and focus  on the area around  your left eye.  Al-
though there is  no  mechanical  process involved, it  may  have taken  you 
some time, first, to create an image of yourself, and then to concentrate on 
a  particular area  within that image.  Regardless  of  whether  you  were suc-
cessful or not, this litle exercise should have given you an idea of the time 
consumed by mere thinking. Obviously, the same conditions apply to learn-
ing, or at least to the cognitive part in learning. But the amount of time con-
sumed by learning is not limited to the runtime of nerve impulses. Al of us 
are  quite familiar  with learning tasks that require  not  only regular ‘pro-
cessing time’, but also interruptions during which our atention is directed 
towards  other things.  For example, a long  distance runner could  not con-
dense  his  weekly training to a single  24-hour session.  Similarly, it is im-
possible to condense the preparations for a difficult exam to a single mul-
tiple-hour session (though we may sometimes be tempted to try). Obvious-
ly,  breaks are sometimes  needed, and there is strong evidence suggesting 
that those breaks do not just serve relaxation purposes but are partly filed 
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with  unconscious  nerve activity and restructuring that fosters the learning 
process unnoticeably. 
Furthermore, learning processes may differ vastly depending on the time 
that is available for learning. Although most people would surely be able to 
recognise a sunflower  when they see one, the  majority  of them  probably 
wouldn’t  be able to tel  whether its leaves  grow alternately  or in  pairs.  As 
long as they are not particularly interested in botany, most people would ra-
ther have set up a conception of the gestalt of a sunflower than of its specific 
systematic characteristics (in the same way we are usualy able to recognise 
familiar  people  without always  being able to  name specific  visual features 
such as a beard, glasses, etc.). This type of learning usualy does not require 
much effort but may take quite long. If, by contrast, we would have to learn 
to recognise and diferentiate a certain number of plants in a short period of 
time, we would probably not atempt to learn them the same way, but would 
try to remember the characteristics we consider to be relevant and easy to re-
member, even though they may not necessarily contribute to the overal ap-
pearance  of the  plant. In Jarvis’s learning cycle (see  Figure  6), this  would 
mean going straight from the situation to memorising without taking any un-
necessary  detours that  might lead to further experience, reflection, and the 
like. 
With this example, two rather broad-brush sketches of how learning pro-
cesses  may look like  have emerged: a  holistic  or  gestalt-oriented,  non-
systematic, time-consuming, and easy  way  on the  one  hand, and a  detail-
oriented, systematic,  quick, and  often arduous  one  on the  other.  Of course, 
they can only be distinguished analyticaly, because in reality, they wil often 
be mixed. Their relation to time is not limited to their own duration, however, 
but also includes the learner’s biography. Toddlers, for example, learn about 
the world not by fiting things into a system but by developing systems out of 
what they learn and experience.  Piaget  has shown crucial steps in this 
process, such as the evolution  of a child’s concept  of  numbers.  The  more 
formal learning becomes, the more it gravitates towards the other side of the 
induction/deduction dichotomy. Systems become more important, and the ho-
listic experience is left for less formalised areas. Certain methods of teaching, 
however, try to reconnect learning to the holistic approach by prefering ex-
perience over systems – that is, by leaving the construction of systems more 
to the individual. From a constructivist point of view, this preference seems 
justified,  but there are equaly strong arguments against it.  Phenomeno-
graphy, for example, thinks  of learning as a change in the relationship  be-
tween the learner and the  object, so a system  of  whatever  origin can  only 
serve as a mediator for this relationship and its alteration. Thus it may be use-
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ful to initiate the systematic learning process while knowing that the system 
itself would not count as the final objective. 
 
Keyword: Self-directed learning 
 
The concept of self-directed learning and its derivatives represent some 
of the didactic conclusions drawn from these thoughts about learning. 
Self-direction in learning gives learners the opportunity to adjust their 
learning path to their individual needs and desires. Particularly, it al-
lows learners to individualy alocate their available time to different 
learning tasks. 
 
There are many approaches that seek to introduce this concept to formal edu-
cation. Some of the most popular ones are related to the educational approach 
of Maria Montessori. A quite prominent concept used here (and in other edu-
cational approaches as  wel) is the  weekly  plan.  The core idea  of this ap-
proach,  which  was  originaly  designed for school teaching and elementary 
education, is to assist students with seting up an individual plan containing 
the tasks to  be completed  within  one  week.  A  weekly  plan  helps learners 
structure their time and efort and encourages them to  develop a realistic 
view of the relationship between their tasks and the time available. Moreover, 
it serves as an informal evaluation tol to  document and review  what  has 
been achieved at any  given  point. In adult education seminars, it is  quite 
common for teachers and participants to set up a schedule for the whole se-
minar together.  Often this is  done in a  brainstorming session and  with the 
help  of cards containing certain  objectives to  be achieved.  These cards are 
then atached to a notice board to be sorted and evaluated. This method may 
foster the feeling of engaging in a shared efort, but it  does not address the 
needs  of individual learners  because they are expected to contribute  – and 
possibly subordinate – their own expectations to a joint decision. Approaches 
of learning advice are a bit closer to the work plan idea because their aim is 
to concretely assist the learner with seting up an individual plan. Puting this 
into the framework  of a formal  weekly  work  plan, as  Montessori  pedagogy 
does, connects the core idea  of self-direction  with the social side  of formal 
learning efforts. 
The coresponding  didactic considerations are  underpinned  by learning 
theories in  many  ways.  The  general idea  of self-direction  has already  been 
mentioned. The social aspect refers to Ileris’s learning triangle, among other 
concepts. Here the importance of being an individual learner in a social con-
text is emphasised.  From this  point  of  view, it is important that  planning 
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(such as  making a  weekly  work  plan  or something similar) is,  on the  one 
hand, an individual activity (as a single plan wil not suit al learners), but on 
the other is done on the basis of a general agreement. The later aspect helps 
ensure that there are regular opportunities to present, discuss, or evaluate re-
sults. According to Ileris and Jarvis, however, this ongoing review is rather a 
means than an end.  As learning is an effort  undertaken in a social suroun-
ding, it should be important to know and feel that others are undertaking the 
same effort.  This  hypothesis is supported  by the research  mentioned above. 
In the  questionnaire  presented in  Chapter  8.2,  46  per cent  of respondents 
agreed or fuly agreed with the statement that other people were important for 
their learning because they were (independently) learning the same. 
From the  perspective  of self-directed learning, teaching  may, to a large 
extent,  be  devoted to  organising frameworks  of time  during  which learning 
may take place. And a look beyond the realm of organised education soon re-
veals that the  history  of educational institutions in society can  be read as a 
history  of  making time available for individuals to learn.  Historicaly, en-
forcing compulsory school atendance first and foremost  meant releasing 
children from  performing other duties. Today, struggles between labour un-
ions and employers are often about the question of how much of their work-
ing time employees  may  use for further education.  Recent  developments in 
higher education take this into account: reformers have made great eforts to 
define students’  workload as a  measure for the estimated time required for 
learning something. The German didactic tradition in particular features a va-
riety of atempts to construct appropriate time schemes. Although they some-
times tended to  be  quite rigid (and  did  not always adequately address the 
chalenge of diversity in learning groups), they stil highlighted the fact that 
learning does not only require phases of instruction and explanation but also 
structured and  valued time to think about,  discuss, and experiment  with the 
content. 
Thoughts about the time structure within the process of learning generat-
ed ideas about a gestalt of learning, which brings us back to the process mod-
els of learning. Kolb’s learning cycle served as an example of how learning, 
in analytical terms, proceeds from one step to the next; obviously, this can al-
so be thought of as a progression in time. Yet the two dimensions must not be 
mixed arbitrarily, as it is often dificult to actualy observe the temporal se-
quence of steps that are easily identified from an analytical standpoint. Bate-
son used the term punctuations to address this issue (Bateson, 1972, p. 162), 
stating that  processes  of learning, like  other  processes, could  be subdivided 
into  many  diferent  ways  depending  on the  observer’s  point  of  view.  Ulti-
mately, it is the learner who has to take charge of his or her learning process, 
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especialy if learning is situated in an environment based on concepts of self-
directed learning. In such instances, self-observation, including the choice of 
appropriate punctuations, is a crucial task for the individual. In this respect, 
teaching includes counseling learners and supporting them in developing the 
ability to  plan and review their learning, especialy  with respect to the re-
quired amount of time. 
9.2  Person: Emotion, cognition, and the lived body 
The German Institute of Adult Education (DIE) recently held a conference on 
learning and  movement (see also  DIE,  2011). ‘Movement’ in this case  was 
not primarily meant metaphoricaly (even though the history of adult educa-
tion is ful of movement-related metaphors), but literaly: the main part of the 
conference  was  devoted to the relationship  between adult learning and the 
movement of the body. Conferences such as this one can be seen as indica-
tors of a growing awareness of the body as an influential and inescapable fac-
tor  of learning. Just as the importance  of emotions for adult education  was 
widely rediscovered in the 1990s, it now seems the discussion has turned to 
the body. However, emotions and cognition also have to be integrated in any 
concept of learning that claims to cover the whole person. The theoretical ap-
proaches discussed in Part One have provided a few insights in this context. 
Emotional aspects  of learning  have  been  discussed in  most  of the con-
temporary contributions to learning theory,  particularly in those  by Ileris, 
Jarvis, and Gieseke. Ileris regards learning as a process involving a kind of 
balance between cognition and emotion. Whereas cognition is predominantly 
responsible for the actual acquisition of the learning mater, emotions accom-
pany the process – but in a way, they also provide (or withhold) the required 
energy (see  Chapter  2.2).  From  our everyday experience, this is  quite  ob-
vious. If we have a positive atitude towards a learning mater, we find it easy 
to spend our time exploring it, and we are more likely to engage even in bor-
ing tasks such as learning vocabulary if they are associated with positive feel-
ings. Furthermore, it has been shown that negative emotions such as anxiety 
tend to inhibit learning (at least learning the  mater that is  being taught, cf. 
Niemi, 2009, pp. 3–4; Gieseke, 2007, pp. 65ff.). In this case, theories of bio-
logical origin on the one hand and approaches such as humanist psychology 
on the other lead to similar results. In a state of anxiety, we are not likely to 
be open to new learning opportunities; we rather tend to search for a way out 
of the intimidating situation.  Actualy, this tendency  has  probably  proved 
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useful throughout the phylogenetic development of humans: facing an immi-
nent danger, our ancestors were wel advised to concentrate on utilising their 
abilities to avoid or defend against it (e.g. by hiding, fighting, deceiving, or 
running from the cause of danger). Later there would be time to reflect on the 
situation and maybe learn from it. Humanist psychologists would argue that 
there is no need for nourishing a desire for learning on the part of the subject 
because the urge for development and growth is given inherently. Therefore, 
an individual’s  non-engagement in a  given situation is  not a reason for  pu-
nishment but for adjusting the situation to the individual’s needs and condi-
tions. 
These thoughts suggest that  we should try to avoid the  occurrence  of 
negative emotions in teaching situations,  but the  wider  question about the 
general role of emotions in learning remains to be addressed. Emotions have 
been regarded as a source of energy, yet this proposition, too, has to be ex-
amined further. Jarvis suggested that learning  generaly  occurs in situations 
of ‘disjuncture’ (Jarvis, 2009, p. 20) – that is, each time a general feeling of 
harmony  between  our  knowledge and  our experience  of the  world is inter-
rupted.  This idea resembles  Festinger’s theory  of cognitive  dissonance  or 
Piaget’s strive for equilibration, for example. What is unique to Jarvis’s idea 
of ‘disjuncture’ is that  he sees the feeling  of  harmony from an emotional 
point of view and, again, that it is the whole person who strives to reinforce 
this feeling. In other words, it is this feeling that drives or motivates us to un-
dertake any efort related to learning,  whether it  be  physical (e.g.  going to 
find a learning resource), cognitive (e.g. concentrating on a tricky problem), 
or emotional (e.g. continuing to study instead of engaging in more comfort-
able  occupations).  From a  didactic  perspective, the  obvious consequence 
would be to arange learning situations in which learners may experience dis-
juncture without feeling so unsetled as to be uncomfortable. 
Yet emotions play a further role in learning insofar as they determine the 
relationship between the various actors involved. In Chapter 6.2, we already 
mentioned the  mirror  neurons as a  means  of  understanding  other  people’s 
mental states. In other words, these mirror neurons enable us to ‘atune’ our-
selves to  others’ emotions and thereby to share  others’ feelings in a certain 
situation.  Gieseke states that ‘emotions form the  bridge to the  other,  which 
makes communication possible’ (Gieseke, 2007, p. 15). The learner as a per-
son thus is emotionaly embedded in a learning situation, and  hence  de-
pendent  on  other subjects.  From a  didactic  point  of  view, this  means that 
emotions are not just something learners may be permited to show in learn-
ing situations,  but rather something to  be  welcomed to a certain extent,  be-
cause only through emotions may a number of disconnected learners build a 
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learning  group.  Any concept  of social learning, from simple  group  work to 
learning communities, would therefore require learners to form some kind of 
emotional tie between each other. But even though having emotions (and ac-
tualy expressing them) is necessary, emotions also need to be controled. 
The importance  of controling  or ‘managing’ emotions, as some  people 
would put it, is not only a concern in pedagogy but in theories of modernisa-
tion generaly (cf. van der Loo & van Rejen, 1992). According to Jarvis, who 
deals with the issue briefly (cf. Jarvis, 2009, pp. 143–144), it is an important 
learning goal, because controling our emotions (and more specificaly, con-
troling the ways we show our emotions) has to be seen as an important key 
competence for social and economic participation. However, managing emo-
tions is already a key part of the individual’s learning efforts. As pointed out 
above, emotions act as a kind of gatekeeper that either fosters or inhibits our 
engagement in learning activities. If a learning mater seems to be of no in-
terest, we are rather unlikely to pay atention to it without external pressure or 
other internal sources  of  motivation. In either case it  would  be  useful to 
create or at least discover positive emotions towards the learning mater. One 
way could  be, for example, to explore  whether something interesting  might 
yet be found in the learning mater; another would be to imagine positive ex-
periences with its application in a diferent context. Strategies like these are 
caled ‘metacognitive’ (Niemi, 2009, p. 3) because they go beyond a certain 
cognitive process. Although the term suggests that metacognition is mainly a 
cognitive process, it needs to be emphasised that the process is closely linked 
to the emotional side as wel. Cognitive tasks (such as learning vocabulary) 
require the subject to decide in favour of the task (and against alternatives). 
This wil positively not happen simply because of rational arguments. Rather, 
it requires the person to be in an emotional state that alows him or her to de-
vote cognitive efort to a given task. 
Sometimes emotional  obstacles to learning are  obvious (e.g. feeling 
scared or threatened), but, as Ileris’s model has shown, any kind of learning 
is accompanied  by emotions that are, in some  way  or another, suitable for 
keeping  up the learning  process.  These emotions  do  not  have to  be closely 
linked to the learning mater itself – I might be bored by math, for example, 
while feeling positive about myself as a diligent student no mater what the 
topic – though it would often be desirable. Metacognition regularly seeks to 
support this, and a lot of course methods do so as wel. One example would 
be the ‘advance  organiser’ (Ausubel,  1960).  Ausubel argued that to foster 
learning and the retention of new knowledge it was helpful to establish a link 
with learners’ existing  knowledge.  Although  he  was arguing strictly from a 
cognitivist point of view, the general idea also works with the person-related 
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perspective and the corresponding thoughts on emotions. Being able to link 
new mater to our existing knowledge strengthens the feeling that it is indeed 
a relevant part of our lifeworld and that, despite its being new, we are gener-
aly able to master it based on our existing abilities. As a result, we are less 
likely to feel disoriented or even threatened. 
Up  until  now,  our  perspective  on emotions  has  mainly  been analytical. 
As we have seen, emotions are an integral part of any learning because they 
belong to the person and are necessary for providing the kind of ‘energy’ or 
‘drive’ that wil help that person make the cognitive (and physical) efort to 
address the learning task at hand. Emotions, however, may also be seen as a 
bodily  phenomenon in and  of themselves.  This  proposition is  not  meant to 
argue in favour  of a  mere  materialistic reductionism,  but there can  be  no 
doubt that emotions are, at least to a certain extent, related to  bodily  pro-
cesses. Emotions may occur along with neuronal activity, the release of hor-
mones, a change in  blood  pressure, and so forth.  But saying that ‘emotions 
occur along with ..’ means dividing the process into two distinct aspects: on 
the  one  hand, there are emotions;  on the  other  hand, there are  bodily  pro-
cesses to accompany them.  Philosophicaly, this is an instance  of the  body-
mind  problem that  goes  back to  Descartes and  has  been  widely  discussed 
both in pragmatism and the philosophy of mind (cf. Ryle, 1990). The ques-
tion  whether these two are separate  processes (a  Cartesian  view),  whether 
emotions are  merely a secondary effect  of  bodily  processes (a  materialistic 
perspective),  or  whether  both represent  different categories  of thinking 
(Ryle’s approach) is serious enough to be mentioned here, but – fortunately 
from an educational perspective – the consequences are largely similar. The 
phenomenon  of emotions, to say the least,  must  be regarded as something 
that simultaneously afects body and mind. 
It was predominantly the area of workplace learning in which the impor-
tance  of the  body  was recognised.  Workplace learning  often involves  psy-
chomotor learning goals; from there, one does not have to go far to see the 
body’s  pervasive influence  on learning in  general.  Researchers in this area 
adopted an ‘embodied  view’ (Hodkinson,  Biesta,  & James,  2008,  p.  31)  of 
learning.  The  diversity  of approaches towards the relationship  of  mind and 
body notwithstanding, educational researchers who deal with the issue at al 
tend to adopt a  phenomenological  perspective. In this line  of thinking, the 
traditional term is the German word Leib, or ‘lived body’. 
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Keyword: Lived body/Leib 
 
The phenomenological term Leib, usualy translated as ‘lived body’, re-
fers to the surplus beyond the consideration of the mere physical body. 
Whereas the body may be regarded as as a separate entity (the sen-
tence ‘my leg is aching’ means that it is me who experiences the pain; 
however, it also means that ‘my leg’ is something separate from me), 
the Leib is inseparable from the individual human. ‘From the body, our 
I is different. We live with the body. With our Leib, we are one.’ (Bas-
feld, 2008, p. 208, own translation) 
 
According to  phenomenology, the importance  of the lived  body  goes far 
beyond emotions  on the  one  hand and  movement  on the  other. In fact, the 
body plays a role in each single instance of perception. What we perceive in 
the first  place is influenced  by  our position in space.  For instance,  when 
watching a bird fly across a cloudless sky, it is the movement of our eyes or 
head that actualy  give  us the impression that the  bird is in fact  moving. 
Moreover, the body is a kind of geometrical ‘zero-point’ (Thompson & Za-
havi, 2007, p. 80) towards which we relate our spatial experience of any ob-
ject in the surounding area. The person-centred perspective implies regard-
ing the body as crucial for learning simply because it is an integral part of the 
person.  Furthermore, social interaction  – an important  part  of learning  – 
deeply depends on bodily aspects as wel: think of the body’s contribution to 
communication, for example.  Ultimately,  we  may  wonder  whether any and 
al learning processes can be regarded as being influenced by the body. Re-
turning,  once again, to the  questionnaire in  Chapter  8.2,  you  might refer to 
your  own case and consider the extent to  which  bodily aspects seemed im-
portant in your learning process. Of course, the answer wil largely depend on 
the specific learning issue. Learning how to calculate  with fractions  wil  be 
regarded as less  body-related than learning  how to swim, for example.  Yet 
the coresponding empirical data show that even in cases in which the learn-
ing issue does not seem to have any immediate bodily relevance, respondents 
rarely answered that the body had no significance at al (cf. Pätzold, 2008). 
The  didactic conclusions  drawn from these findings are  manifold. In-
volving the body (e.g. through movement) may serve to support the learning 
process.  With respect to the learning  mater,  bodily experiences can  help 
learners  perceive the  mater as something that is  not exclusively related to 
cognition. Students many not only assume a certain position in a classroom 
discussion  by stressing a  particular  point,  but also literaly  by  moving to a 
certain  place inside the classroom.  As a result, the  distribution  of  opinions 
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within a group and the efort involved in changing one’s position can be ex-
perienced  holisticaly,  which  may lead to  discussions about the similarities 
between adopting a  position  mentaly and spatialy.  Many action-oriented 
methods in adult education are suitable for exploring and fostering bodily in-
volvement in learning. Yet these methods are bound to be underestimated as 
long as they are only regarded as stimulating alternatives to traditional teach-
ing methods. As such, they may be used to great benefit, but their ful poten-
tial lies in involving the  whole  person in a subject-related learning expe-
rience.  Ultimately, learning through the  body,  or ‘embodiment’ (Freiler, 
2008, p. 40), can be seen as ‘a way to construct knowledge through direct en-
gagement in  bodily experiences and inhabiting  one’s  body through a felt 
sense of being-in-the-world’ (ibid.). 
The fact that emotions and the lived  body  have  gradualy received the 
recognition they  deserve  within the interplay  of the  various aspects  of the 
whole person can be regarded as a sign of significant progress in the recent 
history of the social sciences in general and of pedagogy in particular. Expe-
rimental neuroscience has even shown that some mental processes that were 
traditionaly regarded as rational decisions must rather be seen as emotional 
ones, which only afterwards are amended by rational arguments. These expe-
riments, introduced  by  Libet (1978), reveal the complex  nature  of the rela-
tionship  between emotion and cognition,  but to cite them as evidence  of a 
general predominance of emotions is to overestimate their results (cf. Meyer-
Drawe,  2008,  p.  129).  Generaly, it seems that some authors try to  wage a 
kind of batle in which emotions (or emotions and the body) are pited against 
cognition. In fact, we do not have suficient knowledge to make final judge-
ments  on issues like this; at the same time, there can  be  no  doubt that  pro-
cesses such as learning simultaneously involve  both sides. It is a  welcome 
development, therefore, that the formerly underestimated aspects of emotions 
and the lived body are now increasingly taken into account, and yet it must 
by no means result in an underestimation of the cognitive aspect of learning. 
Each of the theoretical approaches presented in Part One therefore addresses 
the cognitive side, albeit to a diferent degree. Ileris, for example, puts emo-
tions and cognition alongside each other (while rather neglecting the body, as 
we have seen), thus emphasising their equal importance in learning. Jarvis’s 
comprehensive theory  of learning  doesn’t focus  on any  of the three aspects 
specificaly – most of the steps in his learning cycle can be discussed from an 
emotional, a bodily, or a cognitive perspective. Nevertheless, his definition of 
learning (see Chapter 5.1) explicitly covers al three dimensions. 
From among the more recent concepts, the phenomenographic approach 
can  be regarded as the ‘most cognitive’  one.  Although  Marton and  his col-
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leagues do certainly not conceptualise learning as a process devoid of emo-
tional influence, the strength  of their idea  of  progress in learning through a 
change in the way someone sees something rather lies in modeling the cog-
nitive side.  Experiencing a  phenomenon thus can  be seen as a  process in 
which individuals interpret their experience against an internal concept.  Up 
to this  point,  phenomenography, cognitive  psychology, and constructivism 
describe the process in similar terms. Learning then may occur if the individ-
ual, for whatever reason, fails to find an interpretation that matches the inter-
nal concept. One reaction, of course, might be to avoid the experience alto-
gether. (Here, the connection between learning and emotions in general and 
the concept  of  non-learning in  particular emerge.)  Yet the  phenomeno-
graphers care more about the transition from one internal concept to the next. 
Their core idea is that the iritation caused by the lack of an appropriate in-
terpretation leads to a change in the internal concept. 
Now this is the point at which phenomenography, cognitive psychology, 
and constructivism  part  ways.  Basicaly, cognitivism assumes the internal 
concept to improve continuously until it becomes more and more like reality 
itself. Internal concepts, in other words, tend to create an image of the outside 
world.  Constructivism,  by contrast, essentialy considers those internal con-
cepts to be entirely idiosyncratic. Therefore they can neither be regarded nor 
tested as reflections of an external reality. As a result, there are as many in-
ternal concepts as there are individuals, and comparing them directly is vir-
tualy impossible.  The  phenomenographers adopt a rather  persuasive inter-
mediate position. Although they acknowledge that accessing a person’s inter-
nal concepts is indeed impossible, their research approach stil enables them 
to show the  outlines  of these concepts.  Furthermore,  phenomenographic re-
search underpins the hypothesis that, even though the details of any internal 
concept  may  vary from  one person to another, there are general similarities 
between those concepts, and they can often be ordered in a progressive way. 
As  we  have seen in  our earlier example, the concept  of a thermostat as a 
valve can clearly be distinguished from that of a thermostat as a control cir-
cuit, regardless  of the  possible  variance within those two concepts.  Finaly, 
those diferent views do not refer to a given, absolute reality, but to the life-
world of the individual. ‘Learning is seen as a change in the learner’s capabil-
ity  of experiencing a  phenomenon in the  world around them’ (Marton  & 
Pang, 1999, p. 9), which again depends on the individual’s view of it. An ob-
vious consequence is that a person may fail to understand a certain concept 
not because of a lack of cognitive abilities (although that could be an addi-
tional explanation) but primarily because what is to be understood does not 
match the needs and requirements of that person’s lifeworld. 
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The phenomenographic approach has been designed to explain aspects of 
learning with respect to real-world situations in schools and other educational 
institutions. This is why there are lots of didactic conclusions and recommen-
dations, which range from detailed advice on how to teach certain subjects to 
very general ideas. It is impossible to present and discuss al of them in depth 
here. Instead, the folowing paragraphs wil concentrate on some of the typi-
cal and rather general consequences, thereby relating them to other aspects of 
this study guide. 
The  phenomenographic approach emphasises  variation.  Since internal 
concepts become clearer when they are contrasted with alternative concepts, 
there must be a source for variety in our experience and interpretation of phe-
nomena. Phenomenographic research has shown that those variations should 
be  manifold.  One traditional and  quite wel-known approach is to teach a 
grammar rule, for example, by applying it to a variety of different sentences. 
However, from a  phenomenographic  perspective, this  would  not  be enough 
variation  because the rule to  be  used is always the same.  On the contrary, 
there should not only be a variety of different applications but also a variety 
of diferent grammar rules to be applied at the same time. This is unproble-
matic from a systematic point of view, but it leads back to the issue of emo-
tions. It has proven useful to experience the abovementioned type of difer-
ence in a learning situation,  because  one ‘crucial aspect  of learning is the 
ability of discerning diferences and variation’ (Melander, 2009, p. 121). Yet 
it  wil at the same time  be iritating and  maybe even threatening  because 
those  variations inevitably come along  with a certain lack  of  orientation, 
which could cause a feeling of discomfort. The variations provided and expe-
rienced may nourish the cognitive process of learning, but at the same time 
emotional  obstacles  may  occur if the level of iritation is not wel  balanced 
with respect to the learner. 
When  phenomenography  was first  developed,  one  major  question to  be 
answered was, ‘Why do students learn different things from identical texts?’ 
This  observation  may apparently  be explained  by a  variety  of factors in-
cluding prior knowledge, time available, general reading skils, and so on, but 
systematic  differences  between students stil seemed to remain,  which Mar-
ton and  his coleagues  hypotheticaly assumed to  be  diferences in the  very 
process of learning. Some students investigated the text, raised questions they 
tried to answer, and generaly sought to arive at a ful understanding; as a re-
sult, they were able to discuss, criticise, or apply its contents. Other students 
rather tried to figure out only the most important bits of information and pre-
pared to reproduce them when questioned; of course, there were many posi-
tions in between. The two ends of this learning continuum are usualy caled 
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deep  approach  versus surface  approach (or sometimes ‘strategic learning’, 
Cofield, Moseley, Hal, & Ecclestone, 2004, p. 65). 
 
Keywords: Deep approach versus surface approach 
 
A surface approach to learning basicaly refers to learning that is aimed 
at merely reproducing material in a test or exam (e.g. by rote memori-
sation of certain terms without considering their interrelations). Fol-
lowing a deep approach, in contrast, means engaging seriously with an 
issue, guided by a desire for understanding rather than by the need to 
comply with external demands. 
 
Those diferences in students’ learning processes in fact lead to diferent learn-
ing outcomes, which range from mere knowledge of some of the given facts 
(with few or even no ideas regarding their relationship) to a concise under-
standing of the presented issue and knowledge of the facts, too (cf. Marton & 
Säljö,  2005). If  deep  understanding is  desired,  one  obvious  didactic conse-
quence  would  be to instruct students to apply the  deep approach from the 
very beginning. However, the experiment conducted to test this strategy pro-
duced diferent results: compared to the control group, the students who were 
instructed to apply the deep approach turned out to be less successful. Marton 
and  Säljö argued that this  was ‘a special case  of the common  human expe-
rience of transformation of means into ends’ (ibid., p. 51). It should also be 
kept in mind that the students in the experiment, in contrast to those applying 
the deep approach spontaneously, did not raise their own questions about the 
text.  Whereas spontaneous  questions focus  on iritations  or  mismatches  be-
tween the reading experience and students’ internal concepts, questions pre-
scribed by the instructor simply come across as tasks or exercises. The didac-
tic conclusions, therefore, must go a bit deeper. 
Modeling a  deep approach  by suggesting supportive activities (e.g. 
‘write down the most important concepts’, ‘answer the folowing questions’, 
‘create a  diagram showing the relationship  between the two theories’, etc.) 
probably won’t escape al the shortcomings of the surface approach. In fact, it 
may even lead to lower levels  of achievement.  This  may  be avoided,  how-
ever, by considering the emotional side as wel, and by clearly ofering tasks 
as suggestions rather than compulsory exercises. But if facilitators or teachers 
want their students to apply the deep approach to a learning mater, they can-
not help presenting and situating the mater in a way in which it is appropri-
ate for their students to spontaneously  handle it according to the  deep ap-
proach – ‘if we want to promote a deep approach, we should above al keep 
104 
in mind the students’ own interest at the same time as we should try to elimi-
nate the factors that lead to a surface approach (irelevance, threat and anxie-
ty)’ (Marton & Säljö, 2005, p. 54). Obviously this is no easy task, and above 
al, it shows the inevitable experimental side  of education and teaching, as 
too much of the learning process – emotionaly, bodily, and cognitively – oc-
curs on the student’s side and can only be influenced indirectly by others, if 
at al.  Nevertheless,  ofering connections to learners’ interests, respecting 
their emotions (positive or negative) regarding a certain mater, and creating 
opportunities to experience both the appropriateness and the shortcomings of 
one’s own concept of that mater may serve as a profound basis for making 
learners more likely to use the deep approach. 
The  phenomenographic approach  has inspired a  wide range  of research 
on very diferent subjects. Among the topics that have received the most con-
stant atention has been the evolution of the concept of learning itself. Here, 
the  question  has  been  how students think about the issue and learning, and 
which factors may serve to change their perspective. The core idea is that cer-
tain subjects and certain learning situations require a  particular atitude to-
wards learning, along with the respective abilities and skils. With respect to 
university courses, for example, Smith and Blake (2009) stated: 
As learners and their teachers are exposed to the diferent sectors there is a need to develop 
cross-sectoral understanding of what learning can mean if we are to avoid confusion in ex-
pected learning outcomes and learning experiences. (p. 234) 
Marton and  his coleagues  developed a  hierarchy  of learning approaches, 
discussed earlier in this book (see Chapter 3.1). To find out about such con-
cepts is important for general learning research, but it may also have an im-
pact  on learners themselves.  The  difference  between the surface and  deep 
approaches is  one instance  of this impact. It  goes  without saying that the 
deep approach wil generaly result in much more sustainable learning out-
comes. It  would  be short-sighted,  however,  not to consider the impact  of 
different learning concepts in the opposite direction as wel (cf. Coffield et 
al., 2004, p. 25). As learning is a time-consuming process (see Chapter 9), 
the question is not only how to improve the results in terms of retention, for 
example,  but also to support learners in  managing their (temporal) re-
sources efficiently. According to the learning stages described by phenome-
nography, ‘understanding’  would  be the  minimum stage that should  be 
achieved by someone dealing with an introduction into a subject he or she 
is going to study for the next couple of years, whereas ‘memorising and re-
producing’ might be perfectly sufficient for someone giving a welcome ad-
dress in  place  of an indisposed coleague.  Thus a  wel-informed atitude 
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towards  different concepts  of learning is an important  basis for thinking 
about metacognition. 
9.3  Lifeworld: The social and material environment 
Lifeworld is one of the  most important terms in  phenomenological philoso-
phy. This branch of nineteenth/twentieth-century philosophy is generaly not 
easy to  understand, and  neither is the concept  of lifeworld.  Nevertheless, it 
has  been adopted in a  variety  of contexts in the social sciences, including 
education. This is due in part to its huge explanatory power, and in part to the 
fact that many of the philosophical considerations that make up its complexi-
ty  may  be  disregarded  without losing too  much  of the  value  of the concept 
with respect to social situations. The folowing sections, therefore, refer to a 
specific concept of lifeworld defined as folows. 
 
Keyword: Everyday lifeworld 
 
Everyday lifeworld isthe province of reality in which man continuously 
participates in ways which are at once inevitable and patterned. The 
everyday lifeworld is the region of reality in which man can engage 
himself and which he can change while he operates in it by means of 
his animate organism.. . [It is] that province of reality which the wide-
awake and normal adult simply takes for granted in the attitude of 
common sense. By this taken-for-grantedness, we designate everything 
which we experience as unquestionable; every state of affairs is for us 
unproblematic until further notice. (Schütz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 3–4) 
 
This concept obviously addresses issues we dealt with in previous chapters. 
Temporality, for example, is part of the lifeworld (cf. ibid, pp. 45f.), as is the 
experience of the lived body. (In the quotation above, Leib was translated as 
‘animate organism’.) Thus as a further limitation for the folowing considera-
tions, lifeworld shal refer to the  material and social suroundings as expe-
rienced by the person. This approach has proven useful in pedagogy and oth-
er areas that deal with the concept of learning, as stated by Roth: 
Increasingly cognitive scientists agree that to understand knowing and learning, one needs 
to make person-in-situation the fundamental unit of analysis .. . Here, the ‘situation’ is not 
given in an absolute sense, for example, by a scientific description of the physical seting 
(including the ‘task’), but by the situation as it appears to the person. (Roth, 2004, p. 10) 
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Yet the first link we can draw between the lifeworld and our discussions up 
to this  point is  not related to cognitive aspects,  but to emotion.  As  Gieseke 
clearly pointed out, emotions play a crucial role in seting up and maintaining 
our relationship to others; they are part of the ‘social arangement of the life-
world of everyday existence’ (Schütz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 59). On the oth-
er  hand, situational aspects influence  people’s emotions,  which  might  very 
wel cause them to avoid certain situations.  And, as  discussed earlier, emo-
tions have an impact on both bodily and cognitive processes. Ileris’s learning 
triangle translates this fact into a scheme: its lower corner (environment) has 
connections to both cognition and emotion, and these two are linked as wel, 
because they are integrated in the whole person. So a first point to note is that 
learning  wil  be fostered  by circumstances that individuals experience in a 
way that alows them to engage emotionaly  without  having to fear  overly 
unpleasant consequences. Engaging with the environment should provide de-
sirable  prospects. In  Gieseke’s terms,  being  unable to engage emotionaly 
with our environment would diminish the very dimensions of the lifeworld, 
whereas having to fear negative consequences would reduce our wilingness 
to engage with it in the first place. 
On this  basis, the cognitive situation  of the  person-in-the-world can  be 
further investigated. In this respect, we can clearly  distinguish between two 
opposing perspectives. In the first perspective, knowledge about the world is 
regarded as something that exists in an objective way and can, to a greater or 
lesser extent, be acquired by the individual. Learning, according to this view, 
would  mean transmission (Kolb  &  Kolb,  2005,  p.  194;  Reece  &  Walker 
2003,  p.  63). In the second  perspective, the concept  of the lifeworld,  what 
counts for the individual is not a unique objective world, but the world as ex-
perienced.  Experience, however, is  determined by relationships. Knowledge 
about the world, therefore, can only mean knowledge about the world as ex-
perienced  by the individual.  Hence learning, according to this  view, is re-
garded as construction.  Although the term constructivism is rather  young 
(and authors such as  Kolb apply it to this  perspective retrospectively, see 
Kolb & Kolb, 2005, p. 194), the perspective itself is much older. The folow-
ing  quotation  by  Kurt  Lewin ilustrates  how the constructivist  view  dilutes 
the strict sense of objectivity adopted from natural sciences: 
A teacher wil never succeed in giving proper guidance to a child if he does not learn to 
understand the psychological world in which the individual child lives. To describe a situa-
tion ‘objectively’ in  psychology actualy  means to  describe the situation as a totality  of 
those facts, and of only those facts, which make up the field of the individual. To substitute 
for that world of the individual the world of the teacher, of the physicist, or of anybody else 
is to be, not objective, but wrong. (Lewin, 1951, p. 62) 
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This statement evidently supports the position of phenomenography – which 
is not surprising, as phenomenographers use a phenomenological approach to 
examine cognitive processes. To facilitate learning thus means to contribute 
to an appropriate emotional situation and to support learners in finding, chal-
lenging, and developing their own ‘truth’ instead of presenting an alegedly 
objective one, however sophisticated it may be. 
From the  phenomenological  point  of  view, this conclusion  gives  us an 
idea  of  how the individual  may  perceive and  process impressions from the 
environment, and it suggests a number of coresponding ‘didactic situations’ 
(see  Chapter  7.1).  However, the relationship  goes  both  ways.  Cognitive 
processes, emotions, and bodily efects are induced by experienced circum-
stances, but the individual’s reactions may likewise have an efect on the cir-
cumstances. Any kind of communication could serve as an example, because 
obviously, any contribution from a participant in a communication situation 
may  have an efect  on the  others and thereby influence the  process.  On a 
large scale, learners’ reactions and their effects on their lifeworld may have 
an influence on deeper levels of the environment, for example in the form of 
political  participation.  Evidently, this is a  particular concern  of  pragmatism 
that has been discussed by Gieseke and others. This concern, again, has im-
mediate consequences in terms of didactics. As soon as teaching and learning 
are  no longer regarded as isolated  phenomena  within a closed  province  of 
formal learning, but as social processes situated in and mandated by society, 
the resulting efects evidently have to be taken into consideration. The phe-
nomenological approach expands this perspective by stressing the point that 
it is the individual alone who actualy experiences his or her situation in the 
world and ultimately decides what is desirable from this point of view. Yet, 
mutual action and learning can be facilitated, because individuals experience 
different viewpoints and learning aims by encountering others in the learning 
situation. 
Exercises and tasks 
Exercise 1 
Recal the diferences between Leib/lived body and body. What would teach-
ing  be like, in terms  of its  observable characteristics, if the teacher tried to 
take account of the body, the Leib, or neither of the two? 
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Exercise 2 
Recal your previous learning experiences. Did you ever have the feeling that 
your teacher  was talking about a  world fundamentaly  different from  what 
you experience as your lifeworld? Explain the diferences you noticed. 
Exercise 3 
Imagine  you were asked not to teach but to confuse other adult learners re-
garding a certain subject mater. How could you do so – not by saying wrong 
things, but simply by trying not to say things in a way that your students can 
relate to their lifeworld? 
Task 1 
Compare Kolb’s ‘learning style inventory’ (see Tasks 1 and 2, Chapter 5) to 
the deep/surface approach to learning. You may find Cofield et al. (2004, see 
below) helpful for this task. 
Coffield, F., Moseley, D., Hal, E., & Ecclestone, K. (2004). Should we be using 
learning styles? London: Learning and Skils Research Centre. Available at 
http:/www.scribd.com/doc/20311529/Should-We-Be-Using-Learning-Styles 
Task 2 
After having explored the aspects of time, lived body, and lifeworld a bit fur-
ther, you may now want to return to Task 1 in Chapter 3. What further terms 
or concepts do you consider to be useful for exploiting phenomenology with 
respect to a contemporary theory of learning? 
http:/www.phenomenologyonline.com
10.  Conclusions 
As announced in the introduction, the second part of this text is not intended 
to  present a list  of  didactic rules to support  or even secure  good teaching 
practice. Like other professionals, a learning facilitator can make use of a va-
riety of techniques, standardised methods, media, and the like, and wil stil 
need a certain artistic talent to practice the ‘art of teaching’, as Comenius fa-
mously put it in a much-quoted phrase. Thus the folowing paragraphs are in-
tended as a guide to the conclusions we have drawn against the background 
of the theories and concepts discussed in previous chapters. If you have read 
this study guide al the way up to this final chapter, you certainly know too 
much about the facilitating character of teaching and the pedagogic founda-
tions of the concept of learning to expect to be given a convenient checklist 
of simple, easy-to-use rules for teaching.  The folowing summary is  only 
meant to serve as a reminder, to review once more the important implications 
that a serious treatment of learning theory may have on activities related to 
teaching. I hope these conclusions wil support you as you engage in the on-
going project of becoming and being an adult educator. 
Conclusions regarding time: Obviously, teaching requires  paying aten-
tion to the time that is necessary for completing a task. This may be done by 
reflecting on time expenditure with respect to the situation of the learners by 
• counseling learners in their resource planning with respect to time 
• individualising the learning situation in a way that alows diferent learn-
ers to alocate their time to  diferent tasks according to their individual 
needs 
• seting fixed points during the course to get the group of learners together 
and let them experience their progress as a group. 
Conducting group discussions on time expenditure can help prevent discre-
pancies in learners’ time  budgets (in  both  directions, i.e. too  much  or too 
litle time) and increase each learner’s awareness  of the  necessity to  keep 
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track of the time available for completing different tasks. Furthermore, such 
discussions  prevent teachers from  making the  often  questionable assump-
tion that they could precisely predict time requirements without asking their 
learners.  Generaly, teaching requires a sensitive atitude  with respect to 
time.  Having learners’ time at  one’s command, as is  usualy the case in 
adult education, is a serious responsibility that should  not  be taken light-
heartedly. 
Conclusions regarding the person: Emotions are crucial in any teaching-
learning process. Positive emotions regarding the learning mater or the situa-
tion  may influence the  process in  positive  ways.  However,  negative emo-
tions, such as experiencing  disjuncture,  may sometimes  be  necessary to re-
lease further energy that wil help keep learners engaged in the process. The 
only  general  guidance to  be  provided  here, therefore,  may  be that  positive 
emotions are  usualy supportive and that  negative emotions should  be 
avoided as long as they are  not clearly required to  propel the learning 
process. This may be achieved by 
•  being emotionaly competent – that is, by being able to deal with learn-
ers’ emotions constructively 
• acting respectfuly and alowing further emotions to appear and to be ex-
pressed during the learning process 
• alowing emotions to contribute to the formation and  maintenance  of a 
learning group 
• supporting learners in discovering approaches that come along with posi-
tive emotions 
• supporting learners in encountering and integrating the emotional quality 
of learning processes. 
Although there are strategies for dealing with certain emotional ‘chalenges’, 
the emotional side of teaching is an area that particularly cals for teachers’ 
self-development. There is nothing to say against using recommended strate-
gies as long as they are used to accompany a process of ongoing self-devel-
opment and growth (and not used to replace such a process). So the foremost 
way  of  dealing appropriately  with emotions in teaching situations is to  be-
come aware of one’s own emotions as a teacher and to continuously strive to 
improve one’s own emotional competence. 
The lived body is another important aspect of the person as learner. Al-
though  bodily requirements  vary  vastly  with the actual learning task, a few 
fundamental implications exist  due to the fact that the  body, in  part, is the 
person. Some approaches to address these implications include 
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•  keeping in mind that, even as they sit motionless and silent, both learners 
and teachers are beings who are present with their lived body (siting mo-
tionless is a decision, not a ‘natural’ state) 
•  providing opportunities for movement 
•  providing approaches towards the learning  mater that alow learners to 
experience it in a bodily way 
• alowing the bodily aspect of the person to support social learning. 
The educational tradition generaly has either neglected the body or regarded 
bodily aspects  of learning as a special concern to  be addressed  by  physical 
education classes, for instance.  As a consequence, learners are  often  not 
aware of the bodily side of learning at al. This is one of the reasons for a va-
riety of psychosomatic secondary efects of learning and teaching. Although 
they should be taken very seriously, they stil tend to regard the body merely 
as a potential obstacle to learning that must be addressed to prevent it from 
disturbing the  process.  Yet there is hope that a  more fundamental approach 
wil emerge that  wil, first  of al, simply acknowledge the  presence  of the 
body as an essential aspect  of the  person  before categorising it as  useful  or 
problematic.  However, since  we stil  have a long  way to  go in this respect, 
addressing the  body from a teacher’s standpoint  has to  be  done sensitively 
and carefuly, as learners often are just not accustomed to this. 
The cognitive side, even though it is a bit overated in comparison to the 
other two, obviously stil must be regarded as crucial for learning, especialy 
for the learning of adolescents and adults. Some of the theory-related meas-
ures to support cognitive learning include 
•  distinguishing  between a  deep approach and a surface approach;  both 
may be applicable, and it is not at al up to the teacher to decide which 
approach should be used (not normatively, but even less so in practice) 
• introducing learners to both approaches and teaching them how to recog-
nise which approach they are folowing, how to decide which approach is 
appropriate with respect to their aims, and how to pursue the corespond-
ing strategies 
• encouraging students to learn sustainably by ofering them opportunities 
to chalenge the learning mater in a maximum variety of ways 
• creating an environment in  which  mistakes are  not regarded as failures 
but as opportunities to further explore the mater, or even as suggestions 
to see it from a  different angle  by  questioning assumptions  previously 
taken for granted. 
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Conclusions regarding the lifeworld: The lifeworld is not just a certain per-
spective on things that teachers need to respect while teaching. It is the very 
world the learner inhabits – just as any teacher inhabits his or her lifeworld. 
The individual’s learning takes place within this world, although it may even-
tualy change it,  of course.  Teaching, therefore,  doesn’t mean changing the 
learner’s lifeworld  but creating a situation in  which the learning incident is 
connected to, or part of, the learner’s lifeworld. This may sound like a rather 
sophisticated socio-technical efort,  but some  of the suggestions  made to 
support this perspective of learning and teaching have become quite common. 
They include 
• avoiding circumstances that  keep the learner from encountering the 
learning mater as a whole person (e.g. suppressing emotions or provok-
ing negative feelings such as fear) 
• respecting the individual’s  view as  his  or  her inescapable ‘personal 
world’ which is not yours to configure 
•  ofering learning opportunities in which learners may try out new ideas 
instead of being expected to merely adopt them 
• considering the impact of the individual learning efort beyond the boun-
daries  of that individual’s lifeworld.  Learning  often comes  with a 
mandate from society, which is why it is expected to serve the needs of 
societal development. 
Whether you are more inclined towards a radical constructivist world view or 
towards  more  moderate  perspectives, the fact that each  of  us relies  on  our 
very personal view of the world is inescapable. Fortunately, there seems to be 
a considerable degree of overlap between these ‘worlds’, alowing us to com-
municate, to agree  or  disagree, and even to  provide impulses that  may  pro-
voke changes in others (or in ourselves). Any teaching effort is bound by this 
fact –once famously transformed into an aphorism used at the beginning of a 
lecture: ‘I am responsible for what I say but not for what you hear.’ (Rumour 
has it that it was Humberto Maturana, one of the founders of radical construc-
tivism,  who coined this statement.)  Nevertheless, as  mentioned  before  with 
respect to learning time, any teaching activity involves  great responsibility. 
Since writing a study guide may very wel be considered a teaching activity, I 
hope that reading this  book  has  provided  you  with some  new ideas and in-
sights to further develop your approach towards adult education. If that is the 
case, the text has already fulfiled its mission. 
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Exercises 
Exercise 1 
Have a look at the lists  of conclusions.  Take each list and  decide  which 
points are  most important to  you.  You  may  use the result as an additional 
perspective when evaluating your next teaching activity. 
Exercise 2 
Prioritising the lists is one  way  of customising them to suit  your individual 
needs. Another would be to change their content. Decide which items are sui-
table the way they are. Which require a reformulation? And which items do 
you think should be added to cover al the important aspects? 
Exercise 3 
If you are satisfied with your personal list of theory-based demands on teach-
ing,  put it aside for a  while.  Review the items after two to four  weeks and 
find  out (a)  whether  you could stil  give some theoretical reason for each 
item, and (b) whether you stil regard them as properly worded and important 
for teaching. If possible, do this exercise along with other students and com-
pare your results. 
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